Presidental election 2014 in Brazil – A comprehensive and detailed overview of a unique event

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Abstract:

We know that an election begins when the previous one ends. Therefore, the race for the 2014 election began when Dilma Rousseff was elected president in 2010. During this period, Brazil experienced a different scenario from that of the two consecutive terms of Lula, Dilma’s predecessor, especially in terms of its economy. Moreover, the country was shaken by a series of protests that began in June 2013 and which surprised everyone for its scope and intensity as well as its spontaneous and unprecedented nature. At that moment, the evaluation of federal and all state governments collapsed. Analysts understood that History was being rewritten, and the future had become less predictable. The election of the following year needed to be restarted, as it did later, in the middle of the campaign, due to another event that paralyzed the country once again: the death of Eduardo Campos. The fatal plane crash that pulled out of the campaign the most enigmatic candidate. Did he really have the potential that many believed? Could he be, finally, the leader who would be able to bring all the Brazilians together in search of their dream? We will never know. However, we could follow closely what happened next. The steep rise of Marina Silva’s popularity, even before she was declared candidate. And in the following weeks, the erosion of her candidacy, caused by the opponents’ intense attacks, the precarious structuring of her campaign, and the lack of structure of the candidate herself. The migration of a significant number of votes from Marina (which actually were not intended for her, but instead represented especially a rejection to Dilma) toward Aécio Neves allowed this candidate to make it to the second round. He began this period tied with Dilma, and was even spotted as a favorite. The two candidates remained tied until the last moment, which culminated in Dilma’s reelection. All these events were followed by an intense, heated debate in social media that resulted in the formal breakup of friend and family relationships, as well as discussions on a possible splitting of the country between South & Southeast vs North & Northeast, and the traditional dichotomy between the rich and the poor.

Throughout the campaign, we received, in our activity as researchers and political consultants, questionings from journalists and businesspeople who manifested some difficulty in understanding the dynamics of voting. Likewise, we tried to bring some light to the dry, fierce debate between the supporters of each candidate, who sought solely to disqualify the opponents, without acknowledging any merits or contributing to a better understanding of this special moment in Brazilian history.

KEYWORDS: 2014 Brazil’s Presidential Election, Dilma Rousseff, Median voter theorem, Four agendas
Introduction

The current Brazilian election system is defined by the Constitution of 1988 and by the Election Code (law 4.737 from 1965), in addition to being regulated by the Superior Electoral Court as delegated by the law. It follows a model where the citizen aged between 18 and 69 is compulsorily required to go to the polls when an election takes place. According to the current rules, the election for president, governor, mayor and senator follow the majoritarian system. The candidate receiving the absolute majority of valid votes is elected (over half the number of votes determined, excluding blank and void votes). If no candidate reaches the number in the first turn, a second turn is held between the top two candidates.

In the case of federal, state, district representatives and council members, the system used today is the open-list proportional system, where it is possible to vote either for the candidate or the name of the party. During the vote determination process, the total number of votes each party obtains must be determined by adding the votes the party obtained and that of the candidates belonging to that party. The seats are distributed proportionally to the total number of votes each party received. From there, the parties occupy the seats they have won with the candidates who have received the largest number of votes. That is why one candidate with a large number of votes helps elect candidates from the same party or coalition that has obtained a lower number of votes.

The newly created Brazilian Constitution – recalling that the country underwent a redemocratization process after 1988 – now allows the candidates taking up executive offices (president, governor and mayor) to have the chance to run for reelection. This situation took place with the enactment of the Constitutional Amendment #16, from June 4th, 1997, and the first Brazilian President to benefit from that condition was Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who had been elected in 1994 after acting as Finance Minister and taking part in the Real Plan, a fact that was crucial for his reelection as a result of the financial stability the country obtained by curbing inflation more effectively and increasing the population's purchasing power, both serving as the flagship for his reelection, that being the first reelection for President in Brazil.

The improvement of the population's living conditions that started with reducing inflation still during FHC's term and accomplished during Lula's term, who also adopted a policy of open credit, lured investments in the country, and increased tax incentives, made it possible for a large portion of the population to experience an economic upswing, as well as for the country to experience economic growth, factors that, in addition to favoring Lula's reelection, also caused his political capital to increase, and he ended his term in 2010 as the Brazilian President with the highest approval rate in history.
However, on the eve of the presidential election of 2010, questions emerged concerning whether President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva would be able to transfer a sufficient amount of his immense political and electoral asset to the candidate he chose to be his successor, Dilma Rousseff. She was regarded as a figure with low charisma, and with a profile of a very strict administrator, who was not very flexible and was unfamiliar with the political environment she intended to enter.

Even with those first questions, Dilma was elected with a significant difference in relation to her main adversaries, both in the first and second turns, in 2010. However, during her term, continuing with the same economic strategies Lula adopted did not ensure the same effects he had obtained to occur, as it can be verified later, thus making this one the most strongly criticized aspects of her administration. Furthermore, the evaluation of Dilma’s term was directly impacted by some events, the most significant of them being the so-called June Journeys (demonstrations that mobilized thousands of Brazilians, mostly young people, claiming for actions and solutions, on the Government’s part, to issues referring to the increase in public transportation fares at first, but, in the end, concerning the search for solutions to issues covering a wide range of areas – from services provided by companies to public services).

At the end of her term in 2014, polls conducted indicated a large number of Brazilians concerned about the prospect of slowing down the economic growth rate and the social accomplishments experienced during the recent period, as well as the likely return of issues, such as inflation and unemployment, which no longer were part of their daily life.

With all the adversities and criticism Dilma faced in her first term, some important questions within the context of the presidential election of 2014 emerged: even with declining approval rates to her administration, would Dilma be able to maintain the number of votes needed to ensure her reelection? Did the perception of changes provided by her party’s three consecutive terms in power draw loyalty from a sufficient number of voters, aside from the PT party’s declared supporters?

Several studies seeking to understand the vote conditioning factors in the Brazilian elections, as well as the voter’s profile (among them, those based on the median voter theorem) show that the election for majoritarian offices is solely possible by gaining the majority of voters located within a central point of a normal distribution. Thus, polls conducted clearly showed that Dilma and her party counted on the majority of the votes coming from the lower income voters, as well as from a significant portion (and vital for her reelection) of voters in not so adverse economic situations. At the same time, her main adversaries were aware that, if they were not able to gain a larger portion of voters – in addition to those belonging to segments different from that of their typical voters, namely, those belonging to better social conditions, with medium and high education levels, and, above all, residents in the country's
Southeast and South regions – they would not stand a chance to “break” the streak of victories the Labor Party achieved in the recent presidential elections.

We will try to show how gaining (in Aécio Neves’ case) or keeping that median voter (in Dilma Rousseff’s case) would be vital for determining the results of the elections of 2014, although these strategies have not always been clearly perceived at that moment.

The median voter theorem

The Median Voter Theorem is an important subject within the study of the Theory of Games, and, even more so, within that of Political Sciences.

Initially developed by Bowen (1943), Black (1948) and Downs (1957), the Median Voter Model determines that, under the hypothesis that the voter's preference presents a "single peak" in a majoritarian voting system, the voter will choose the candidate whose goods and public services package offered comes the closest to the one the median voter demands. This model is quite reasonable, but few studies proposed to empirically test its validity.

An article presented by Menezes, Saiani and Zoghbi (2001) establishes that concerning the packages each candidate offers, one should notice “it would be hardly possible to measure them, since they are potential packages and not actually accomplished ones”. However, the authors point out that the reelection cases allow better analysis to be conducted on the feasibility of the candidate’s actions:

“[…] when the candidate is already elected and runs for reelection. In this case, one can suppose that the package the candidate offers is established by the amount and allocation of expenses made during that candidate's term, including the election year (MENEZES, SAIANI and ZOGHBI, 2001)

Since not many empirical works seeking to test the validity of the median voter model were conducted in Brazil, there are more works that study the determining factors for reelection, particularly when there is the possibility that the reelection be partially determined by how successful the candidate running for reelection is in meeting the median voter's demand.

While the candidates running for a first turn seek to meet the median voter's preference by providing information on the potential packages of goods and public services they offer, the candidates for reelection, in turn, might try to meet the median voter's preference by offering the packages they believe are the closest to the demands made during their term, where the authors state that “one cannot measure the public service package in a single turn, but one can measure that package for those running for reelection” (MENEZES, SAIANI and ZOGHBI, 2001).
One of the things the theorem seems to explain is that there are certain phenomena that occur in the majoritarian voting system. One thing is that it is able to explain why the candidates tend to adopt very similar campaign programs and propositions, since, in looking for gaining the majority of votes, the politicians end up adjusting their propaganda, messages and propositions to what the median voter looks for, and it is common to campaigns to occur by orbiting around the center of the voter's average preference. Just like TV ads offer similar products, but with small advantages among one another, the candidates present similar speeches, but with slight changes to them, so as to make their proposition look more appealing, and gain the vote from the voter.

Another point the theorem is able to explain is the reason why more extremist candidates or parties are hardly able to elect representatives. The more extreme a politician's positioning within the political spectrum is (left or right), the more difficult gaining as many votes as a politician with more moderate political positioning will be. Finally, the theorem is also able to explain the reason why two major parties emerge in majoritarian voting systems (Ley de Duverger). According to the theorem, some parties will rarely win an election for the very reasons more extremist candidates will not be elected, so the parties tend to form alliances, often incorporating part of their programs, so as to ensure a larger number of votes. That fact is clearly perceived in the Brazilian case.

**Recent background of the Brazilian elections**

So as to understand the context of the election of 2014, we must analyze the main aspects and events during Dilma Rousseff's first term. And to understand that period, we will analyze how the general public perceived Lula's two terms, and highlight this moment's most relevant meanings (under the political, social and economic viewpoints).

**Lula's terms as president**

After three defeats when running for the Presidency (1989, 1994 and 1998), Lula obtained two significant victories in 2002 and 2006 – he won his first turn as president, from 2003 to 2006, by securing 61% of the total votes, and the second turn, from 2007 to 2010, by also securing 61% of the total votes. In the first situation, his main adversary was José Serra, and in the second one Geraldo Alckmin was his main adversary – both candidates belonged to the main opposition party, the PSDB.

His first victory can be largely explained by the drop in popularity rate Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) experienced during his second term as the President of Brazil.
After completing his first term with a high popularity rate (he was able to be reelected in 1998 still during his first turn by securing 53.06% of the total valid votes), mainly leveraged by the success of the Real Plan, which brought stability to the currency and to the economy after a long period of high inflation rates (or hyperinflation as some economists characterize it), FHC faced a quite adverse scenario over the course of his second term. After a series of international crises, particularly the so-called Asian (1997-1998) and Russian crises (1998-1999), the country suffered strong currency depreciation, dropping the fixed exchange rate and adopting the floating exchange rate. These factors caused the President to end his second term with a low popularity rate, and his administration was rated as poor, thus making room for his opponent from the PT.

During Lula's administration, inflation rates remained in check and some economic indicators were positive, such as economic expansion – with increased GDP growth rates – reduced SELIC interest rates, advanced debt payment to the IMF, and increased international resources. The maintenance of low inflation rates, the economic growth (according to some critics, excessively supported by the large offer of personal credit and incentives to specific industry sectors, such as carmakers and durable movable goods manufacturers, when they should invest in infrastructure works), and – the great highlight of Lula's administration – the social programs of income transfer of which the Bolsa Família (Family Allowance) program is the leading exponent, and financing mechanisms for the access to private education for the low income portion of the population – caused visible impact on improving the living conditions of the population in general, and, notably, of the lowest income population, while providing Lula with historical approval rates.

Even the crises that occurred during the period – most of them involving some corruption schemes – had no impact on the positive evaluation of Lula's administration while leading the Executive Power. The so-called Mensalão (monthly bribes to Congressmen performed by the PT) was the most notable corruption scheme, since it involved some of the most relevant names of the Labor Party and Federal Government. Among others, the name of José Dirceu was the most iconic of them all, since he was the strongest name in the Government, coming only after the President, took office as the President's Chief of Staff, and was considered Lula's successor at the time. Dilma succeeded him, both concerning the office and preference for running for President.

An interesting factor of Lula's second election was precisely the dissonance in profile in relation to the traditional Labor Party voter. While in 1989, Lula's first election attempt, the PT voters were more concentrated among the population with the highest economic affluence; in 2006 that profile was reversed, largely thanks to the advent of social programs that allowed better living conditions for the low income population. We can observe this profile shift in both tables below.
Voting intention per income in the 2nd Term of 1989

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<th>Up to 2 MW</th>
<th>+ than 2 up to 5 MW</th>
<th>+ than 5 up to 10 MW</th>
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<tr>
<td>Collor</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lula</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<tr>
<td>None / Blank / Void / Doesn't know / Didn't answer</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Singer (1990) based on Ibope data.

Voting intention per income in the 2nd term of 2006

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<tr>
<td>Lula</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alckmin</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
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<tr>
<td>None / Blank / Void / Doesn't know / Didn't answer</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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Source: Ibope

According to Singer, this shift in profile is largely influenced by the "tripod consisting of Bolsa Família, minimum wage and credit expansion, added to the specific programs referred to, resulting in a significant reduction of the poverty level as of 2004, when the economy started to grow again and the employment rate increased. That is what Marcelo Neri calls “Lula's Real”: “During the 1993-1995 biennium, the percentage of people below the poverty line drops by 18.47% and, during the period between 2003-2005, the same percentage drops by 19.18%” (SINGER 2009). That means that the effect Lula's first term caused (with the increase of the minimum wage's actual value in addition to social programs, such as Bolsa Familia) had the same impact as the implementation of the Real Plan (which had, as a consequence, the increase of the population's purchasing power resulting from actually curbing the inertial inflation process).
2010 Election

At that moment, the government supporters expected Dilma, should she win the election of 2010, to continue with the main lines Lula had defined, particularly those who directly benefited from the social programs, who feared they would be discontinued if another candidate secured more votes than her and replaced Lula as president.

At the time, a polarization between voters of the main candidates, Dilma Rousseff from the PT and José Serra from the PSDB, was expected, which actually happened, but with a quite significant participation of Marina Silva, candidate for the PV. Dilma's vice, already at that election, was Michel Temer, president of the PMDB, party with which the PT intended to carry out the so-called coalition government.

Dilma, aside from being politically sponsored by Lula, was represented as a strong person, able to continue the works of the previous administration and to expand them. She was seen as the person of trust of the then President, particularly for her quality as administrator, since she had led important boards and ministries (Dilma acted as member of the Petrobras Board of Directors, and led the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and acted as the President's Chief of Staff), factors that only strengthened Lula's endorsement to her candidacy.

Serra presented a resume that included many accomplishments and public works. Among other offices, he had acted as Federal Representative, Mayor of the City of São Paulo, Senator and Governor of the State of São Paulo, in addition to Minister of Planning and, later, Minister of Health during Fernando Henrique's administration, acting quite outstandingly in that position, and strong recall of some measures of impact, such as regulation of generic medication, which has greatly reduced the cost of many medications for the population.

Marina presented a remarkable life story because of the political leading role she took on concerning social and environmental causes, with international recognition, despite her extremely humble origins. She was Councilmember in Rio Branco, the capital of her home State, Acre, State Representative as well as Senator for that State, always for the PT. Lula chose her to become the Minister of the Environment office, she quit because of conflicts with other Ministries, and because she felt she had not received the support from Lula she had demanded as a condition for staying at the head of that office, factors that culminated in her detachment from the Labor Party and affiliation to the Green Party, which filed her candidacy for President in 2010.

The election was marked by some important events among which we can highlight the accusations Dilma (and Lula, who, despite being still the president, actively participated in the campaign) made that Serra would not continue with the social programs, particularly that
of income transfer, largely approved by the lower income population. Dilma and Lula heavily criticized FHC’s term as President, by attributing to him the implementation of actions, regarded as too shy, toward reducing inequalities in the country, and with a low effect for the majority of the population. This strategy left little room for Serra to act, since he could not say that the programs established during Lula’s term would be discontinued, while saying that he would maintain or expand them would mean to write a receipt of his approval to the adversaries. Another important point to be highlighted concerns personal attacks, and, with particular aggressiveness, those between Serra and Dilma. The most critical situation concerning that field was the fact that Serra accused Dilma of being in favor of abortion – despite being declared as a secular state, Brazil is among the countries with the largest Catholic-Christian population. This caused Dilma to temporarily lose some votes, particularly among evangenic voters, and along with the charges of encouraging influence peddling and corruption involving a person who was directly linked with her, and who would succeed her as President’s Chief of Staff, and, most of all, the strong presence of Marina in the dispute (who greatly benefited from the votes of the evangelines) caused the election to be transferred to the second turn, which actually occurred.

Despite ranking third in the running for Presidency, Marina Silva comes out from that process stronger, with a highly relevant electoral asset. She secured almost one fifth (19.33%) of the total valid votes, and almost twenty million nominal votes. That was by far the most votes the PV received in all the elections the party took part in.

In the second turn, the distance between candidates remains the same, and Dilma wins with 56.05% of the total valid votes against the 43.95% Serra obtained.

**2011 to 2014 – Dilma’s first term**

Although Dilma’s presidential cycle naturally closed over the four years after she was elected, it would neither be possible nor advisable to try to discuss the period as continuous and linear, since it presents specific issues at specific moments, which allows us to split it into 3 important moments: 2011-2012, 2013 and 2014.

The events that occurred during each one of these periods are crucial to understand the movements and the result of the presidential election of 2014.
Dilma Rousseff was introduced and elected by taking on a position of competent administrator. In the beginning of her term, the supposed centralism Dilma presented – difficulty in passing on certain responsibilities to federal states, making decisions and concentrating revenues – was not seen as something that would disturb her performance as administrator, and the same goes for keeping a distance from the press and the lack of dialogue with the ally base. During the first year, there was the allegation of an illicit asset increase involving the then President's Chief of Staff, Antonio Palocci, and that ended up being the first major crisis in her administration, and culminated in his withdrawal. Still during her first year as administrator, another seven ministers were removed from office as a result of their involvement in corruption allegations, a fact that made the press report that the recently elected President was "spring cleaning" her administration, namely, she did not tolerate cases of corruption, and acted ethically in replacing her subordinates.

Still in her first year as the head of the Executive Power, Dilma was already counting on the dissatisfaction of the main ally party, the PMDB, because of the delay in releasing parliamentary amendments as well as the budget. This fact granted the Government some important defeats (such as the approval of the Forest Code proposal, which Dilma was vehemently against). Soon, the first year of her administration was overwhelmingly marked by resignations from ministers, and tensions with the ally base. However, the dissatisfaction on the ally base's part would remain – and would become even more severe – during the entire period of her administration.

One point to be considered, but that at that moment did not bring great impact to her administration’s approval rate, was the economic issue, exemplified by the substantial increase in inflation rates, the “ghost” of the international crisis and low GDP growth rate. The question was about the fact that a certain exhaustion of strategies employed could occur since Dilma had just continued to apply Lula's economic policy without making significant changes to the model. According to some economists, 2012 was marked by successive interventions from the government on the economy, such as the increase in import tariffs and IPI (tax on manufactured products) for foreign cars, ban on automakers concerning the dismissal of their employees, increase in PIS/ COFINS (Social Integration

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1 Antonio Palocci had already requested to be dismissed in 2006, when he was the Minister of Finance during Lula’s administration.
Program/Contribution to Social Security Financing) taxes on imported products, and an increase in the import tariff for some products, factors that would have consequences the following year.

During the first two years of her administration, important social programs were launched, such as Brasil sem Miséria (Brazil without Poverty), the second edition of Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My House, My Life) and Brasil Carinhoso (Caring Brazil), which would benefit about 2 million families.

In December 2012, the CNI/IBOPE poll recorded that 78% of the interviewees approved of how Dilma was administrating the country – a percentage that was higher than the one FHC and Lula had obtained toward the end of the second year of administration of each one of them:

![President approval rate at the end of the second year of term](image)

Source: IBOPE Inteligência

### 2013

The second half of Dilma’s term occurred within a quite different context. In early 2013, Dilma looked optimistic and stated that this would be the year Brazil would grow, and she adopted an economic policy called the New Economic Matrix, guided by a tax expansionist policy, low interest rates, subsidized credit, depreciated exchange rate, and by the increase in import tariffs so as to encourage domestic industry. However, the results were not the ones expected, and brought as a consequence the relative loss in credibility of her economy team, increased Government debt, low GDP growth rate, decline in consumption, and lack of foreign investments.
One of the points commented on in 2013, that might reflect the "mood" the investors were more accurately, can be identified in the Campo de Libra auction, the largest oil reserve in the country, which counted on the participation of only one consortium (even attracting the participation of two of the largest oil companies, it was thought that other companies would be interested in the auction and take part in it).

Another point to be observed refers to the events that occurred in June 2013. As it will be handled in detail later, demonstrations occurred across the entire Brazilian territory, at first demanding the removal of the increase in the public transportation fare that had occurred in some cities. However, the demonstrations brought to light how dissatisfied the population felt about a series of themes, such as corruption, quality of the public services, investments in strategic areas, among others. The protests had a direct impact on the approval rate of the President and Governors, causing the positive evaluation the respective governments had received to decline drastically:

**Positive evaluation of the Governors and the President**

![Graph of positive evaluation]

Source: IBOPE Inteligência

Many of the issues brought up during the demonstrations that needed to be actually discussed were of the Federal Government's responsibility. Within that context, the supposed delay, on the President's part, in responding to the demonstrations was one of the negative aspects attributed to Dilma's performance, namely, if her distant positioning concerning the
press and the population had not brought any discomfort so far, at that moment it became an issue.

The year of the Demonstrations

The world observed a series of demonstrations that were graphically isolated but with many elements in common, either concerning motivations or how they were organized. The most iconic of them were (established with this nomenclature): Arab Spring, the Outraged in Spain, and Occupy Wall Street.

In all the cases, heterogeneous groups of people, until then without any type of contact with one another, and no link with any type of organization – group or political party – came together to protest against their government and against the political class in general. Concerning the Arab Spring demonstration, its main motto was to protest against a specific form of government, one of a dictatorial nature, in addition to the outcry for structural changes to their society. As for the other situations, they concerned a more comprehensive agenda, which started with a perception of social injustices that were enhanced with the world crisis of 2008, and increased the distance between politics and everything the population really needed and demanded – taking as accurate that each movement had its own proposition.

In all the situations, the communication through social networks among people was a determining factor for the events to reach large proportions. And, concerning the Arab Spring demonstration, it worked in making the violence of the police repression and in denouncing the deaths that had occurred public.

This same dynamic would be repeated in Brazil, reaching its peak in June 2013 (fact that led these demonstrations to become known as Journeys of June), but they had started before this period. The trigger was the increase in urban bus fare in São Paulo, but, despite the smaller proportions, this event had already been experienced in other capitals a decade earlier at least.

In 2003, the Revolta do Buzu (Bus Uprising) occurs in Salvador, promoted by high school students against the increase in the bus fare in that city. Although the movement was coopted toward the end by local authorities and formal representatives of the category – oblivious to the movement – how that articulation occurred was remarkable. The gatherings would form spontaneously at locations were they would prevent the buses from moving, with a lack of hierarchy or even significant leadership among the members. It was the embryo of what would follow at other locations, and counted on the participation of about 40,000 people. The following year, in 2004, the Revolta da Catraca (Ticket Gate Uprising) takes place in Florianópolis, and it had the desired practical effect: the increase was revoked by means of
the occupation of bus terminals and main access points blocked. That year also marks the establishing of the MPL, Movimento Passe Livre (Free Pass Movement) in São Paulo. In 2005 the Revolta da Caparica takes place once more in Florianópolis, preventing another increase from being put into effect, and the establishing of the MPL Brazil. The demonstrations follow each other: in São Paulo, the same year and in 2006, in the Federal District in 2008, São Paulo once more in 2009, 2010 and 2011 - in this year the movement spreads across countless capitals, protesting against the increase in fares.

The year of 2013 begins with mobilizations in the cities of São Paulo and Porto Alegre. In June, in São Paulo, clashes between students along with other groups and the Military Police intensify. The mutual aggression culminated in particularly violent actions on the PM's part, not just against the activists, but against the population as well, which did not take part in the event, as well as journalists, who were covering the event. This was a determining factor for the media in general to focus their attention on the protests on the days that followed, promoting extraordinary visibility to them, while condemning the truculent action of the police, as well as the refusal from the public authorities to talk with the population.

This situation caused a larger number of people, and more heterogeneous groups, to take to the streets to take part in the protests as well. And with the diversity in people, diverse demands were made. The conducting wire for the vast majority of themes was the disgust toward the behavior of the political class in general, and how the country's chronic issues were historically dealt with. There was nothing new about the demands, but a clear feeling of tiredness concerning the supposed neglect this agenda has always been conducted with in this country.

A poll IBOPE Inteligência conducted with protesters shows the most clear themes for the participants: public transportation, political environment, health, PEC 37 (bill that removed the power to conduct investigations from the Prosecution Office), and the expenses made with the World Cup in Brazil.

Aside from the motto: “It's not just about the 20 cents”, which pointed toward a more comprehensive agenda, the events were characterized by the use of posters and slogans referring to the high cost of the stadiums being built at the time, needed for the World Cup, which would take place in the country the following year, a fact that had already foreshadowed certain difficulties that could be faced because of the event. Terms, such as “Hospitais padrão Fifa” (Fifa Standard Hospital); “Saúde padrão Fifa” (Fifa Standard Health), “Escolas padrão Fifa” (Fifa Standard Schools), “Educação padrão Fifa” (Fifa Standard Education), etc. were present in all the demonstrations along with texts and discussions on social networks about the supposed misuse of the money involved in organizing the World Cup, and everything that could have been done to favor the population with the amount of money the Federal Government used in construction works for the World Cup.
Many of the most immediate demands were met, such as the reduction in the bus fare in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Manaus, Curitiba, Goiânia, Porto Alegre, Recife, Natal and in 50 other cities. Furthermore, free passes were issued to low-income students, approved in several States and municipalities, and pending approval in some others. Likewise, taxes were reduced for buses, trains, subways and watercrafts. By taking into account the population's outcry, the allocation of 75% of royalties from oil revenues to the education sector, and 25% to the health sector was established. Also, the PEC 37, bill that would remove the power to conduct investigations from the Prosecution Office, was revoked. Furthermore, the Anti-corruption Law was prepared, and acts of corruption became hate crimes, in addition to the creation of the "Clean Slate" for public offices, and the end of the secret vote in preliminary impeachment processes.

Another important fact to be noted is that, even with these responses to the demonstrations that occurred during that period, the approval rate of Governors in all the States and Mayors in many cities dropped significantly, and so did the President's approval rate as well, bringing up countless speculations about the consequences of the events for these politicians, in a way anticipating the discussion for the election that would take place the following year.

Despite the so-called Black Blocks, who by means of planned acts of violence and vandalism moved most of the people away from the movement, causing it to lose strength and prematurely become diluted, a series of questions remained, and could only be satisfactorily answered in the future. Questions such as what would the impact of the dissatisfaction citizens brought to the streets be, and whether that critical impulse would translate into a more critical vote. And whether a larger number of annulled votes or abstentions would occur, in the same way that there were questions about the type of politician that would be more affected by this new agenda, and whether there was any politician that would benefit from this movement. By thinking about the time still left until the election, and, in the meantime, the World Cup being hosted by the country, the question about the likelihood of those stimuli going cold and reaching the election diluted among so many other issues and demands lingered.

Moreover, on December 10th that same year, on World Human Rights Day, a manifesto of the movement was released and titled: "If you don't have rights, there will be no World Cup": "(...) June 2013 was just the beginning! The people, the movements, and outraged collectives, wanting to change the reality, stated, by means of several struggles, that without the consolidation of social rights (health, education, housing, transportation and many others) it is not possible for the Brazilian people to host mega-events such as the World Cup or the Olympic Games." The document includes many of the demands made in June, and highlights that many of them would have been met as a result of the strong popular pressure at that
moment. Five movements signed the manifesto: Movimento Passe Livre (one of the main catalyzer of the political protests that occurred in June with the agenda of the public transportation model), Fórum Popular de Saúde do Estado de São Paulo, Coletivo Autônomo dos Trabalhadores Sociais, Periferia Ativa and Comitê Contra o Genocídio da População Preta, Pobre e Periférica. Thus, just like in June – although being organized more formally and functionally – the movement was highly heterogeneous despite having a supposedly more specific agenda.

2014

In 2014, as a result of the aspects aforementioned, Dilma Rousseff presented a discredited image toward the end of her term. The country's economy showed the depletion of measures adopted for its recovery, which caused the economic environment, in late 2014, to be in a less favorable state than it was at the beginning of her term as President. Inflation rates had reached the goal's limit, despite still being below the historic average, a fact that would not make the situation more comfortable for the Federal Government. Measures that were adopted earlier to make personal credit easier, discounted IPI for cars and other goods, reduced electricity rates did not have the desired effect. The country ended up having to face an energy crisis, suggesting the likelihood of having a blackout, and rechecking the facilitated credit requirements it had adopted earlier. If the country's GDP had presented a dissatisfactory growth rate of 2.7% in 2013, the following year, the same rate was just 0.1%, a result basically supported by the service sector, against the limited participation of the industry sector.

2014 The World Cup in Brazil and General Elections

On October 30th, 2007, Fifa officially announced Brazil as the host of the 2014 World Cup, and this decision was unanimous among all the 20 members of the organization's Executive Committee. The country would host the competition for the second time after a break of 64 years.

The opportunity to host an event of such magnitude was greeted by many at the time as a victory of Lula's administration, which saw the event as a great opportunity to show Brazil to the other countries as being different (and much improved) from what people thought. However, after the major demonstrations that occurred in June 2013, to host the World Cup
could represent an issue for the Government and organizers, as well as a factor that would weaken the reelection of Dilma Rousseff.

The main criticism concerning having the World Cup in Brazil was the Federal Government making public funds available, in view of the costs for building the twelve stadiums that would host the games of the event, and the quality standard they should be built with (the “Padrão Fifa” (Fifa Standard) had become one of the main mottos of the demonstrations in June 2013 after members of the entity demanded from the Brazilian committee responsible for the World Cup that some processes met the specific requirements it had established concerning the construction of the stadiums, accommodations and the like). Within this context, the cost of the stadiums and what could be done with those funds to favor the health and education sectors (two of the most mentioned sectors by the population) were compared. However, other factors were mentioned, such as allegations of overcharging concerning the construction work, whose final cost was way above the first estimates, as well as the delay in completing the stadiums. Furthermore, along with building the stadiums, there was the promise of carrying out works and interventions on the infrastructure, particularly concerning urban mobility, which never happened, and that also served to feed the motivations for the protests across Brazil. Another point to be taken into account is that allegations were made about the supposed excesses committed by the Federal Government and some State-owned companies: Fifa would have requested a smaller number of hosting cities, and, consequently, of stadiums. By reluctantly allowing the use of so many hosting cities, they would not have demanded that stadiums, with the same quality standard as those in major cities, be built in secondary cities.

The occurrence of protests against hosting the World Cup in Brazil, and a movement for it not to take place would be a direct result of what was seen in June 2013. Thus, 2014 began with the protests expected that promised to continue until the World Cup, which would take place between the months of June and July. However, despite the dissatisfaction mood, the sports schedule ended up prevailing over politics, and, to the great relief of the Government, the population started to follow the event daily with emotion, and doing the best they could to give a warm welcome to the tourists arriving in Brazil.

**Background of the presidential election of 2014**

Concerning the Presidential run, the election of 2014 was marked by some questions and unforeseen events that significantly changed the course of the primary election. At first, because of the demonstrations of June 2013 and the impact they caused on the Government's approval rate, as well as the questions about the country's future context
because of the World Cup hosted in Brazil, there was a feeling of uncertainty concerning the
candidacy of Dilma Rousseff, then the current President. It was speculated that Dilma could
lead to the possible candidacy of the former President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The truth is
that the conjecture was fed by some Labor Party members, in the case of an "expected"
defeat of Dilma, but it was never authorized by the former President himself. Even with these
rumors, in the PT Convention held on June 21st, 2014, Dilma's candidacy and the alliance
with the PMDB became official, since the name of Michel Temer was kept as her vice on the
list. A different situation occurred with the main opposition party, the PSDB. Even without
holding preliminaries for choosing the name of who would run for President for the party,
there was a backstage dispute between Aécio Neves and José Serra, who had run for the 4-
year office before. Overall, Aécio was able to grant José Serra a significant defeat concerning
the candidacy to the Presidency of Brazil, since Aécio had taken on the position of President
of the PSDB in May 2013, (a position Serra desired). Another fact marked that period prior to
the election, and was once more related to the candidate, Marina Silva.

After leaving the Green Party (the party she ran for in the election of 2010, and finishing
the dispute in third securing 20 million votes) in July 2011, Marina Silva presents the
proposition of creating her own party, which would allow a candidacy within the molds the
former Minister desired. The Rede Sustentabilidade (Sustainability Network) project
presented the possibility of a new way to do politics and to obtain greater popular
participation, by aligning economic development with sustainability. However, the project was
accomplished only in 2013, during the Encontro Nacional da Rede Pró-Partido (National
Meeting of the Pro-Political Party Network), and it was from that moment on that signatures
started to be collected for filing the new party with the Superior Electoral Court. The intention
was to collect 492 thousand signatures by February 2013, thus making Marina's candidacy
as head of the list in the next election possible. The party obtained 910 thousand signatures,
with 250 thousand of them being discarded, since, according to the organizer's
understanding, they were regarded as not valid. Thus, by the end of August of the year in
question, 660 signatures were delivered to the Electoral Registry Offices. However, 580
thousand signatures were analyzed, and only 440 thousand of them were regarded as valid
– the registry offices rejected the others, and, in most of the cases, unjustifiably. The Network
then appealed to the Superior Electoral Court, requesting that 95 thousand rejected
signatures were validated. However, on October 3rd, 2013, the ministers of the Superior
Electoral Court denied the registration for creating the party, and, so, Marina Silva was not
able to run for President for her own party. Within this context, October 5th, 2013 was the final
day for those who wanted to take part in the election the following year to become affiliated
to some political party. And, on that day, in a ceremony held in Brasília, Marina joins the
Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party), giving her full support to the candidacy
of Eduardo Campos. However, even with this declaration, the possibility of Marina, since she
had obtained a significant number of votes in 2010, was better known by the voters, and had ranked second in the election polls (well ahead of Campos), to come out as head of the list was cogitated. But what actually occurred in 2014 was that Eduardo's candidacy was made official, and Marina became his vice. The expectation was that Marina, in possession of her political asset, would leverage the voting intention for the PSB candidate, who, at the time, had received a quite dissatisfactory percentage in the election polls, since he was not known by a significant portion of the population, and had yet to distribute his electoral propaganda, which could promote his image.

The Campaign for the Presidential election of 2014

An important agenda about the opinion mood for the election of 2014 refers to the perception of continuity or change. In early 2014, the population saw the change issue as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Jan/14</th>
<th>Feb/14</th>
<th>Mar/14</th>
<th>Apr/14</th>
<th>May/14</th>
<th>Jul/14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would totally continue /</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would make a few change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would totally change/ Would</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a maintain a few programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't know / Didn't answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(THOSE WHO WANT CHANGES FOR THE NEXT ELECTION COME IN) Do you wish for changes to the Government, but with Dilma as President or changes to the Government with a different President instead of Dilma?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>(1169)</th>
<th>(1252)</th>
<th>(1278)</th>
<th>(1369)</th>
<th>(1303)</th>
<th>(1316)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes to the Government</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but with Dilma as President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes to the Government</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but with a different President</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>instead of Dilma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBOPE

At first, the fact that a bit over one fourth of the population shows desire for changes with the same current Government seems like a paradox. That brings the thought about whether the
population sees changes as something collective, involving a set of changes, or whether that change is guided by individual elements of daily life, such as changing to a better job, to a better house, among others. According to what was observed, apparently, a significant portion of the population sees these changes as being at individual and daily life levels. This behavior the citizen-voter presents that we can classify as more pragmatic, whatever feeds the high level of expectation by accomplishments that bring tangible benefits, is described by countless political and social analysts, as Balbachevsky and Holzhacker (2004) illustrate, according to whom, the voter values the results much more than the issue of learning who is responsible for those results, or what are the possible obstacles and how they will be overcome. Furthermore, there is a preference shown by the characteristics the performance of the candidate presents that overlaps that candidate's ability to oppose some agenda or another candidate, as well as to the voter's identification with the candidate. This preference indicates a higher level of pragmatism.

Unlike in 2006, when Lula, her predecessor, was reelected, Dilma Rousseff faced another agenda in the Brazilian opinion mood in 2014: after the stabilization and fight against issues linked with creating jobs, housing, inflation, and wages, the issues concerning health, education and public safety remained as the most relevant themes among the Brazilian issues, and are the ones where the Brazilian population most demanded improvements be done, so much so that these are issues that have lasted through the governments and increased as a concern of the population: health is indicated by 49% of the population in 2006 and by 71% in 2014; public safety, within the same period, goes from 31% to 45%, and education jumps from 24% to 43%.

Source: IBOPE
Meanwhile, the Federal Government's performance between 2008 and 2013, in relation to these neuralgic points, drops significantly:

Source: IBOPE

Better quality public services, particularly in the health, education and safety sectors, seems to be the great current challenge the Brazilian administrators face. This topic is better detailed by the philosopher, Renato Janine Ribeiro. According to the author, four agendas have existed in Brazil within the past thirty years: 1) The country's re-democratization; 2) Inflation rate control; 3) Social inequality reduction; 4) Improved public service quality, such as education, health and safety.

The first agenda is that of re-democratization, led by the opposition to the military regime (1964-1985), whose leading performer was the MDB (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) (Brazilian Democratic Movement). According to the author:

“The first agenda was knocked down by the military dictatorship. That process took 21 years, was conducted the entire time by moderate opposition, which some would mock by calling it 'consented', but, in reality, had the courage to run the risk of being the opposition at a difficult time, under the clear leadership of a party, the PMDB. Other parties, still young because of the late suppression of the bipartisanship, gave their contribution toward that direction, – the PT and the PDT –, but the PMDB conducted it.” (JANINE, 2014)

The PMDB was the party with the largest concentration of forces of opposition to the ARENA (later becoming PDS), which represented the interests of the military regime. By means of a careful and patient process of political articulation, the first agenda is finally consolidated with
the indirect election (by the Brazilian Congress) of Tancredo Neves, candidate for the PMDB to the Presidency in 1985.

With the first agenda established, the next point was to end one of the legacies of the end of the military regime that had lasted for fifteen years: unchecked inflation rates. That agenda had as the leading political actor the PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira) (Brazilian Social Democracy Party), which succeeded in 1994, still under Itamar Franco's administration, and was consolidated during President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's term (1995-2002). Janine states that the phase was mostly characterized by technical knowledge than by social mobilization per se:

“Contrary to the overthrow of the dictatorship and social inclusion, the party did not come first and the change followed: the PSDB took on a previously defined cause as their own, without ever backing up on their support to the plan. The struggle against inflation is different from the struggles against the dictatorship, because it has a technical dimension to it that is hard to convert it into political mobilization. I know no examples of demonstrations against inflation. Worse, what the streets say or do not say can overthrow a dictator, but can hardly beat inflation.” (JANINE, 2014)

With the end of the soaring inflation, the agenda – the third one – becomes the establishment of more social equality, which was taken over by the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) (Labor Party) and Luís Inácio Lula da Silva's leadership, and is the period between 2005 and 2010, the peak of this process' first stage.

**Comparison with the social pyramid of the economic class distribution:**

**2005 and 2010**

![Comparison of Economic Classes](image)

Source: *IstoÉ, Dinheiro magazine, 2011*
The second stage, more arduous (since it involves more effort for including the still components of the base of the socioeconomic pyramid), is in progress, as the author explains:

“The dictatorship and inflation lasted for too long, but the victory over them was relatively quick: after three years we had a new Constitution, after months we had a new currency. Now, social inclusion is a longer process. Suppressing poverty is gradually more difficult as the number of poor individuals lowers.” (JANINE, 2014)

The fourth agenda of the Brazilian democracy is characterized by the improvement to the quality of the public services provided, particularly health, education and safety, which, today, are at levels that do not follow what is expected for a society that presented significant progress concerning income distribution.

This fourth agenda of the Brazilian democracy presents some characteristics that are distinct from the other three: it comes from the bottom up, namely, it is not a demand created by any political party. No acting individual from the political party system embraced the cause and/or demanded a response the public opinion regarded as convincing; meanwhile, the possible party participation received a certain repulse among the protesters of 2013. Another distinct aspect is that it is demanded concomitantly with another agenda (decreased social inequality) that is still on course, which had yet to occur.

It is of importance to point out that the demand for quality public services is nothing new; there is a sequence of many years of adverse news conveyed on news shows (such as waiting in line for hours at hospitals, lack of proper cognitive ability from students who attend public schools, public safety policy issues, among others), in addition to successive global comparisons that place Brazil at a great disadvantage concerning the health and education systems.

As Janine points out:

“What is important here is that the fourth agenda starts before the third one is complete. Even worse, the inclusion agenda is becoming increasingly harder, and, while this occurs, a new agenda is added to it. The country must complete a complex task of inclusion of millions of historically discriminated individuals, while significantly improving the main services the State should provide.” (JANINE, 2014)

So as to accomplish the fourth agenda, an ideological-party commitment is missing, which does not seem to exist among the main parties in the country.
By taking into account the context exposed concerning the Median Voter Theorem in which the closer to the center of the political-ideological spectrum candidates are, the greater the chances of securing votes and coming out victorious in majoritarian elections will be, at the time of the demonstrations of 2013 it seemed logical to suppose that the candidate taking ownership of the speech of the fourth agenda of the democracy could agglutinate the preference of those who are neither at the right nor the left end of the ideological spectrum, and would start the election process in a situation of higher competitiveness. However, the party system itself found it difficult to enter the discussion about the agendas related to the demonstrations, and faced rejection from the protesters.

Among the main candidates running for the Presidential office, Dilma Rousseff represents the accomplishment of the third agenda, but already with a worn out process, since she was not able to significantly advance the process her predecessor had started. Furthermore, many questions were raised about how effective the fourth agenda would be, since the issue about the high costs for hosting the World Cup, according to common sense, was interfering in this process. By adding to these factors the attempt of opposition groups to "kick" the current President and the political party she belongs to more toward the extreme left side of the ideological spectrum, by labeling them as "communists" and "Bolivians", in a clear attempt (valid within the political game) at trying and reducing the candidate's vote potential. In turn, at the beginning of the electoral process, Rousseff has most of the votes of PT supporters in her favor, in addition to being able to count on the recipients of social programs (particularly Bolsa Família), as well as those who endorsed the support Lula was giving to the candidate.

In turn, the PSDB candidate, Aécio Neves, made every possible attempt at placing himself in the center of the electoral spectrum, according to the interview he gave to the “O Globo" website, where when asked about what to do, so that his party was not mistaken for groups that defined extreme right-wing agendas, he said: "I'm a son of democracy. What happened was the use of movements of the society by some nostalgic minority that has nothing to do with our background and us. (...) There was a moment in my grandfather's, Tancredo, campaign in 1984, when they pasted some posters around Brasília with the Communism symbol. It was a more radical right-wing movement's way to say that he was a communist. Tancredo said: "Look, it's useless to push me toward the left side, because I won't budge." He was a man of the center. And now I say: "It's useless to push me toward the right side, because I won't budge."

Finally, the speech of Eduardo Campos and Marina Silva had yet to be clearly understood by the population, regardless of a possible alignment of the fourth agenda with some other agendas of the “New Politics” (so broad reaching that it could encompass it all, making it blurry at times). However, that was not necessarily an issue while Eduardo Campos was at
the head of the list; with his death and Marina Silva's consequent performance by starting her campaign at the same level as that of Dilma Rousseff, the batteries turned against the PSB candidate, thus starting a deconstruction process of the “New Politics”, resulting in the gradual emptying of Marina Silva's candidacy, as we will see later.

The movement of the Presidential election of 2014 and the Marina Silva factor

The date of July 5th, 2014 was the deadline for political parties to present the respective registration of their candidates. Even with some questions that were raised concerning the candidacy of some politicians belonging to more visible parties, strictly speaking, there were no surprises. The candidates who started the dispute and competed in the election, and their respective parties are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Party Number</th>
<th>Name of the candidate</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Aécio Neves</td>
<td>PSDB, PMN, SD, DEM, PEN, PTN, PTB, PTC, PT do B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Dilma</td>
<td>PT, PMDB, PSD, PP, PR, PROS, PDT, PC do B, PRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Eduardo Campos</td>
<td>PSB, PHS, PRP, PPS, PPL, PSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Eduardo Jorge</td>
<td>PV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDC</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Eymael</td>
<td>PSDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRTB</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Levy Fidelix</td>
<td>PRTB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOL</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Luciana Genro</td>
<td>PSOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mauro Iasi</td>
<td>PCB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Pastor Everaldo</td>
<td>PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Rui Costa Pimenta</td>
<td>PCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSTU</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Zé Maria</td>
<td>PSTU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the first survey IBOPE Inteligência conducted including the name of the Presidential candidate, Eduardo Campos, for the PSB on July 21st and August 6th, showed Dilma Rousseff (PT) at the top with 38% of the voting intention, while Aécio Neves (PSDB)
followed with 22%. Eduardo Campos received 8% of the voting intention, and Pastor Everaldo (PSC), who at this moment was the only evangelic candidate in the dispute, and estimated as luring a larger number of votes over the course of the Presidential run precisely because of this fact, obtained 4%. Just like the previous elections, the percentages of those who stated the intention of voting blank or null (16%) and of those who did not know who to vote for or would rather not answer (9%) were high.

However, on August 13th, 2014, an accident involving the airplane in which Eduardo Campos was a passenger caused the candidate's tragic and untimely death, along with that of all the others who were in that flight. The candidate came from a traditional family, politically speaking, (his grandfather, Miguel Arraes, was elected Governor of Pernambuco in three situations: in 1962, but was removed from office the following year because of the military intervention, in 1986 and 1994), was elected State Representative for Pernambuco in 1990, federal representative for the same State in 1994, 1998 and 2002. He also acted as Minister of Science and Technology from January 2004 to July 2005, during Lula's administration, and was elected Governor of Pernambuco in 2006, being reelected in 2010 on the first turn with 82.83% of the valid votes cast. Given Campos' background and his quite expressive performance in 2010, the dispute for Presidential office in 2014 was a natural process within the party, since the candidate was becoming stronger as a third option to the PT and PSDB polarization.

During the pre-campaign period, the analysts speculated that Eduardo Campos, who until then was allied with the PT, and whose administration as Governor of Pernambuco was very much in line with the Federal Government, even benefiting from that alliance by bringing federal partnerships and investments to his State, planned on not supporting the PT in the election of 2014, but on launching his candidacy only in 2018. At a certain moment, he began considering the launch of his candidacy in 2014 as the most suitable strategy for increasing the level of awareness of his name and background among the Brazilian voters, since, with the exception of the Northeast region, he was relatively unknown across the other Brazilian regions (according to the survey IBOPE Inteligência conducted between May 15th and 19th, 2014, 25% of the voters from the North/Mid-west regions stated they did not know enough to give their opinions, and 20% of the residents in the Southeast region stated the same thing), and thus be introduced as a strong name to run in 2018.

His untimely death significantly altered the course of the election (both in the election for President, as well as in the State elections, more specifically in the State of Pernambuco), and amidst generalized commotion, there was speculation about both the name that would replace him, as well as strategic changes in the campaigns of other presidential candidates, since that was the beginning of a new election. In this sense, in regards to the name that would be chosen to substitute Campos, the choice of his candidate for vice-presidency,
Marina Silva, could seem obvious. However, given the circumstances of her affiliation to the PSB, (after Rede Sustentabilidad had its registry denied) the nomination of the former minister was not seen in a positive light by some of the party leaders, who believed she was using the party in an opportunist way, not having any connection to its historical past. The Campos family supported the nomination of the former minister and, albeit without consensus within the PSB, her nomination was made official on August 20th, 2014 (the chosen vice-president was Beto Albuquerque, also from the PSB). Everything happened amidst much discord and disagreement, such as failure to comply with regional alliances established by Campos which weren’t accepted by Marina, the use of people of her own personal trust to handle strategic campaign functions, and some important party members leaving. One of the parties of the coalition, the PSL, left it after suggesting that Marina did not follow through with her commitments.

Coming up next, we will comment on the key movements witnessed in the electorate’s position after the death of Eduardo Campos and his substitution in the dispute for Marina Silva, which will be analyzed in further detail in the next segment, starting with voters’ profile variables, based on surveys carried out at that time.

Even with all the conflicts triggered by the choice of Marina as running candidate for the PSB, the first poll carried out by IBOPE Inteligência displaying the name of Marina as a candidate for presidency, on August 26, 2014, showed an important movement in the political scenario. Both Dilma and Aécio showed a decrease in voting intent, if compared to previous polls displaying the name of Campos (3% and 4%, respectively). Dilma had 34% of voting intent and Aécio showed up with 19%, while Marina took up second place with 29% of mentions. Those who hadn’t decided yet and those who had previously declared the intention of voting blank or void positioned themselves at that time as favoring the PSB candidate (there was a significant reduction among them: blanks and void votes were 13% before the death of Eduardo Campos, but dropped to 7% in this poll, and the undecided went from 11% to 8%).

In the second poll carried out by IBOPE Inteligência on September 2nd, Marina’s outcome was even better, since she presented a growth of about 4 percentage points. Dilma made a recovery, oscillating between 34% and 37% of voting intentions. Aécio Neves, however, had a decrease of 4 percentage points. Pastor Everaldo – with the enrollment of an evangelic candidate boasting a considerable electoral capital – oscillated negatively between 3% and 1% of mentions (he even began hearing “suggestions” for him to give up the dispute in favor of Marina, but he stuck by his nomination until the end). The remaining percentages, from other candidates, blank/void and undecided only oscillated within the error margin.
From then on, what is seen is Dilma’s almost constant recovery, Aécio’s shy but gradual increase, and the downward trajectory of Marina, who can’t resist the intensity of the attacks made by the campaigns of both Dilma and Aécio, along with a series of contradicting positions displayed by the candidate. In fact, since her nomination was revealed, there was already some speculation about the conflicts between the image that was being built of a Marina as the defender of the environment, aligned with the younger generation, with the great causes of the left wing, and as an alternative to established ways of doing politics in Brazil, and between the image of a conservative person in regards to several issues (regularizing same-sex marriages, decriminalization of abortion). Some positions weren’t sufficiently clear for voters who demanded more objective and direct answers, while others were even seen as ambiguous. For example, when she drew back, due to pressure from evangelists, and denied the text of her government program that approached homosexual rights, Marina gave material to her adversaries which was richly exploited, both by campaigns, as well as by the regular media, and particularly by the defenders of these rights.

Marina was intensely pressured to clarify the meaning of the “new policy”, about who were her allies and collaborators, and to clarify how she would deal with specific issues, like the economic agenda, social benefits implemented ever since President Lula’s first term, about agricultural business, the country’s energy matrix, etc. Little by little, the promise she represented and everything she could symbolize – being a black woman of humble origins, and above all because of her extraordinary story of life, of fighting and achievements – faded away, and she herself began to show signs of weariness and frailty when faced with the heavy artillery turned against her.

The point of reversal was the last debate carried out by Globo TV, on Thursday, October 2nd. At the time, Aécio had managed to present himself to the voter as a more viable possibility, since he had already occupied an executive position (governor of the State of Minas), was familiar with the political environment, had faced Dilma firmly and confidently, and managed to bring clearer answers to the questions put forth to him.

Research carried out both by IBOPE Inteligência and Datafolha show that a massive move of voters happens at this point from Marina to Aécio. This enables one to infer that a good number of these voters actually intended to vote against Dilma’s reelection, rejecting her name or party, and upon seeing Aécio as a more consistent option, they did not hesitate to reposition their vote (though they kept their intended option).

Electorate behavior in Brazil and the profile of voters

In the extensive bibliography about the attempts at defining the voter’s profile, or the vote’s profile, the models most commonly used to explain the reasons for the vote are the
psychological and sociological perspective and the theory of rational choice. In the case of the Brazilian voter’s profile, there was a great number of works targeted especially at the first two, and there is currently a greater production of the psychological and rational choice lines.

It is important to understand that there is no ideal model to define the best explanation to understand which aspects define the profile of the voter, and there are no impediments in regards to any interaction between the different perspectives in order to try and explain the electoral profile, since each perspective was useful to its own time and space, and this evidently also applies to the Brazilian voter, just as Radmann (2001) showed in his work about electoral behavior when trying to bring to light the reason for some studies to develop based on one line in detriment of another:

“Since the Brazilian voter should be receptive to the manipulation of populist, personalist and clientelist leaderships (Leal, 1975; Wenffort, 1980) and the electorate masses would hold low levels of information and ideological structuring (Castro, 1994), electoral behavior should not be driven by a rationality in the Downnsian sense. However, some works seek to analyze the electoral behavior of Brazilians from the point of view of rational choice, such as Souza (1972) and Figueiredo (1991)” (RADMANN, 2001).

Some notes state that the Brazilian voter has a personalist and pragmatic posture, according to studies presented by Marcello Barquero, which point toward a voter who is “marked by phenomena such as disbelief and mistrust regarding politics and politicians (BAQUERO, 1994), as well as a strong feeling of political ineffectiveness (BAQUERO and CASTRO, 1996). According to him, this is possible due to “mistrust and disenchantment with institutions, particularly with political parties” (BAQUERO, 2000) that voters started having.

There is also the issue of the political sophistication of voters² that Castro (1994) tries to explain that while the sophisticated voter (the minority) vote guided by opinions about a variety of issues and a preference for parties based on an informed view about their parties and candidates, the greater mass of people is uninformed and has no opinion about the big issues of political debate, and also:

“[...] Tends to attribute to their candidates the qualities that please them the most and the opinions that they occasionally have about several issues and have a low level of ideological consistency” (CASTRO, 1994, p. 180).

² The degree of political sophistication is constituted based on a sum of four variables: the interest in politics, the involvement in the electoral process, exposition to the free electoral program on television and the degree of information regarding the presidential candidates.
On the other hand, Singer (2000), who discourses about the ideological division of voters according to perspectives of left and right, tells us that, despite the voter having merely abstract knowledge of the meaning of left and right, therefore not knowing how to verbalize his or her understanding of these concepts, they manage to indicate a position, according to their inclinations on a given scale. And “the same intuition leads them to place candidates (and parties) on this scale and vote coherently” (SINGER, 2000, p. 149).

Also speaking about the vote according to the rational theory, Borba (2005) explains that the vote of a majority of the electorate would guide itself based on the “images” of candidates, which would be “diffuse” and “vague”, though not entirely random and unpredictable, since the unsophisticated voter would vote mostly on the candidate that would manage to convey an “image” of a privileged champion of the “poor”, the “workers”, the “majority of the population”.

This type of vote behavior is also explained in the work of Terepins (2011) who, when analyzing the position of candidates regarding the electorate also considers the Downsian theory that, aiming to win the election, political agents condition their propositions to a standard of the population’s preferences (DOWNS, 1999). According to her:

“The author claims that political representatives act in a rational way, maximizing their utility, that is, they use a “sufficiently planned action to reach economic and political goals that have been consciously selected by the actor” (1999, p. 41). (...) Therefore, “parties formulate politics in order to win elections, instead of winning elections in order to formulate policies” (1999, p. 50)” (TEREPINS, 2011).

This type of position on behalf of political agents would be explained by their attempt to seek a maximization of votes, presenting programs and actions to be promoted in detriment of the voting committee’s preferences, a position that aligns with the Median Voter Theorem proposed by Black (1948). According to the author, each voter prioritizes the propositions in an order of preference, so that the utility curve can take on any shape.

Therefore, Terepins (2011) converges with the idea that Brazil is drawing closer to a scenario in which:

“The improvement of visual and sound aspects with the growing technology and relative freedom of expression of candidates enables the viewer and listener to have a perception that goes beyond the content of
their discourse. The sensations conveyed by visual appearance, by the tone of voice and overall characterization with which the candidates present themselves are inherent to the public’s opinion. Therefore, the collection of variables that characterize the candidate start to gain importance, setting him or her apart from the role of a mere representative of their party’s ideas” (TEREPINS, 2011).

Supported by the ideas of Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), the author argues that the party-candidate relationship depends of how institutionalized the parties are, being that “the more institutionalized, the greater the possibility that voters will base their party preferences on an ideological and programmatic way (…) Otherwise, less institutionalized parties allow for less of the party’s social roots, enabling more of a personalist conduct on behalf of the candidate” (Terepins, 2011).

This way, the author agrees with Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) by stating that in Brazil, the choice of vote is still much more associated with personal traits of the candidates than it is with the programmatic and ideological contents defended by the parties and coalitions, which still shows a certain weakness of party roots in our political system.

Radmann (2001) takes the same path as proposed by Terepins (2001) and Castro (1994) about the Brazilian people’s way of deciding their vote by defending that voters choose candidates based on a “key value” they present, with this key value being characterized as “subjective trust” and linked “to a personality trait or an action or “political feat”” (RADMAN, 2001). For the author, voters would be much more motivated to vote for a “reason of an emotional order” than for a political reason, because they are “devoid of political sophistication” to pick a candidate, defining this choice based on “their values, their perceptions and their moral judgment” (RADMAN, 2001).

This type of posture, both from the electorate as well as from political agents, can be explained by the fact that Brazil is part of a group of countries that compose the post-1978 democratic opening, characterizing a political environment marked by the preeminence of the candidate’s individuality regarding his or her party. Such a characteristic establishes, in our party system, the model of Representative Democracy which Manin (1995) describes as the third stage of representative government – as opposed to Electoral Democracy – and inserts Brazil, since in the Brazilian case there is a greater emphasis on the individuality of politicians in detriment of political platforms, a situation brought about by the development of communication networks (television, newspapers, the internet), that convey special attention to the candidate’s characterization in order to bring him or her closer to the population.
By establishing this type of condition on political agents as well as the electorate, Terepins (2011) shows there is a direct relationship between the personalization of Brazilian elections with high party volatility, since there is mediation between the media and the attempt at approximating candidates and voters.

Finally, what the productions about the electoral behavior or Brazilians bring to light is that there is no single perspective to explain the vote and that this choice is usually made for reasons that vary between ideological, party or emotional reasons, being that intuitive and emotional perceptions and assessments around the image of candidates have directed the voter.

**Voter profile, according to electoral polls during the 1st round of the 2014 campaign**

The Brazilian electorate has peculiar characteristics, especially if we take into account that it is still young, in the sense of the constitution of a presidential democracy, which only happened after the military left power and overall elections for presidency took place in 1989, a fact that enabled stabilization of the political party system and overall elections started occurring uninterrupted, but with some peculiar characteristics, being that two of them are worth mentioning: the first is that since then the Workers’ Party has always been in the presidential dispute, having Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former union leader and one of the party’s founders as their exponent. The second is that since 1994, the Workers’ Party (PT) has enrolled in a constant dispute with the Brazilian Social Democrat Party (PSDB), for the presidency of the republic, which has gone on for six presidential disputes, with the PSDB emerging victorious on 2 occasions (1994 and 1998) and the PT winning 4 victories (2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014).

Such a condition enables us to notice that throughout all of the disputes – and in each of them – the profile of the Brazilian voter presented variations that must be analyzed, and the analysis of the results of electoral polls carried out during the presidential race is one of the ways that enable us to understand how the election was defined. As such, electoral polls that took place in the 1st round of the 2014 presidential elections presented results that could be analyzed in detriment of the intention of vote that candidates presented within the segments of the population.

Out of the 11 runners for the position of president of the Federative Republic of Brazil, three candidates showed greater absorption from the electorate: Dilma Rousseff, candidate for reelection; Aécio Neves, the key political adversary both of the party to which Dilma belongs (in this case, the Workers’ Party, greatest ideological adversary of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party, to which Aécio belongs), as well as the political and economic matrix
adopted by the government, and Marina Silva, a candidate that stood out in the 2010 elections after breaking up with the Workers’ Party where she had started her career – Marina was affiliated with the PT until 2009 – and announcing her candidacy for the Green Party, but who in 2014, after a succession of facts, as mentioned before, was announced as an official candidate for the Brazilian Socialist Party.

The first surveys after the official launch of candidacies gave the three key candidates a much larger competitive advantage than any of the other runners – it is important to highlight that before Marina Silva joined in, the candidate that had the position of applicant to Brazil’s Presidency was Eduardo Campos, who appeared in the electoral polls as a candidate with low penetration among voters, according to the observed results, making it impossible to measure just how much the candidate would grow during the electoral campaign, since his death happened before electoral campaigns began airing on TV and on the radio.

The three of them held more than 80% of the voting intentions, being that Dilma, the candidate for reelection, had the widest advantage among them.

The analysis of the results for voting intentions according to the voter profile offers us a possibility of understanding what the advantages were that each candidate presented within the population and what the profiles they should seek to attract were in order to get elected.

**Dilma Rousseff**

From the beginning of the research, Dilma Rousseff displayed an advantage regarding the competition. Heiress to the political capital of former President Lula, the profile of voters who declared their vote to be for Dilma Rousseff in the 1st round of the 2014 elections stayed pretty much the same as that of those who had elected her in 2010, more declared voting intentions among people with lower school levels, lower income and residing in the north east of the country. This points towards a consolidated position of the candidate within this profile, that displayed growth throughout the campaign, when compared to voting intentions for other candidates.

However, she saw part of her political capital decrease when compared to the 2010 elections. In comparison to the survey carried out just before the 2010 elections, the results for the same period of 2014 showed a retraction in declared voting intentions for the candidate. In regards to the voters’ school levels, Dilma kept the same proportion of votes among people with low school levels, but lost her strength as the voters’ school levels rose:
The same movement can be verified in the respondents' income conditions, with the same behavior noticed for school level; as the voter's income rises, the declared voting intentions for the candidate decrease:

Therefore, it is possible to infer that despite consolidating herself within some segments, throughout the period of both presidencies she ran for, Dilma Rousseff saw not only a decrease of part of her political capital in various segments, but also wasn’t able to increase her electoral capital among those same people who voted for her in the previous election. That is, it would not be wrong to state that the results of the segments presented in the polls showed that they remained loyal to the candidate, however, there is a significant loss among some of these, which began to show worse results than those observed in the previous election. In any case, the candidate had a greater advantage among the other runners and finished the first round of the elections in first place.

Marina Silva

The arrival of Marina Silva into the elections was marked by a series of commotions (from the veto to the creation of her party – REDE, which “obligated” her to be affiliated with the PSB to form a partnership with Eduardo Campos, causing a political dispute within the
party itself in order to decide who would run for presidency – to the tragic accident that culminated in the death of Eduardo Campos, the running candidate at the time), but even so, it happened vigorously, since electoral polls carried out before the accident with candidate Eduardo Campos brought the other competitor to the position (Aécio Neves) as a competitor with greater potential to face Dilma Rousseff – running for reelection.

Coming from the 2010 dispute strengthened by her speech about renovation, new directions, new policy, and which could qualify her as the most apt candidate to meet the demands and expectations voiced by part of the population since the marches in June 2013, Marina had an important increase in her political capital in 2014, if compared to 2010, especially in segments in which she had no political power. The surveys pointed out that voters who declared their vote for Marina Silva were similar to those identified in 2010 (higher school level, wealthier and residing in the Southeast and Central West areas). In the case of voting potential according to school level, as well as consolidating her position among those with a college education, Marina saw her political capital grow among those with lower education levels.

Also consolidated among the wealthy, Marina showed signs of strengthening voting intentions among those that had a household income of up to twice the minimum wage:
The strengthening of her image enabled Marina to enter the dispute with a peculiar protagonism, which was confirmed early on in the first survey done after she entered the dispute and indicated that the candidate was placed second in the polls (despite the evident leverage that her name experienced at that moment due to the emotional mood caused by the death of Eduardo Campos).

Both surveys that followed Marina Silva entering the elections showed a mature candidate, strongly prepared for the dispute and with a possible potential for growth throughout the campaign. However, some obstacles along the campaign made Marina Silva’s candidacy go from a meteoric ascent, to a weak and vulnerable candidacy, much influenced by the unclear behavior regarding what this new policy would objectively mean, and about which would be the different measures than those of her competitor that she would undertake if she won.

Aécio Neves

The only one among the key candidates running for the presidential elections for the first time, Aécio Neves had the seal of PSDB on his campaign, being the key political adversary of the current government, a story that began in 1994, with the PSDB winning two important victories (1994 and 1998, both in the 1st round), and four consecutive defeats (2002 and 2006 against Lula, and 2010 and 2014 against Dilma), all of them against PT.

Seen as the political heir of Tancredo Neves and a very positively evaluated governor for Minas Gerais in two terms, his administration ended with approval levels over 80%. He was elected governor in the first round in 2002 with 58% of votes and was once again elected in the first round in 2006 with 77% of votes. He elected his successor in 2010, also in the first round, with over 65% of votes, being elected senator with 39% of votes.

All of these conditions guaranteed a certain advantage for Aécio Neves in the elections when facing the other runners, as well as a very strong alliance with several parties (a total of 8), which manifested dissatisfaction with the current government. However, the death of Eduardo Campos left his second place in the polls threatened, since as soon as Marina Silva took over the position, she immediately took the place in the polls that belonged to Aécio up until that point.

The detail that draws attention in this period is the direct dispute for the electorate that Aécio and Marina are locked into, since both were counting on more expressive votes among voters with similar profiles: voter: higher school level, wealthier and residing in the Center-South.

Even with Aécio managing some success in the 1st round, when he surpassed Marina Silva in the final stretch of the campaign and moved on to the election’s 2nd round stronger
than in the beginning of the dispute, the challenger to the position saw the electorate’s preference for his party decrease, since the candidate that ran for the previous election (José Serra in 2010) had obtained better results in several segments, especially those in which the candidate for the Workers’ Party appeared to be stronger, such as those with lower school levels.

![Bar chart showing voting preferences.]

Also among voters with a lower income, the declared voting intentions displayed a retraction in the intention of votes for the PSDB candidate during the polls in the first round of the 2014 elections, if compared to the same period of 2010:

![Bar chart showing voting preferences by income category.]

However, the marketing actions, as well as televised debates and the lack of a foundation for the discourse promoted by Marina Silva throughout the campaign caused Aécio to reclaim the position and move on to the second round. Dilma Rousseff was consolidated as the preferred candidate in the North and Northeast, but saw her electorate diminish in the other areas, especially the southeast, the greatest electoral college, where the votes for the Workers’ Party candidate dropped 8 points – they also dropped in the mid-west (7 points) and the south (6 points).
Marina Silva was greatly strengthened in the northeast area, evidently thanks to the upheaval caused by the death of Eduardo Campos, a political leader in the area, and also consolidated her political capital in the areas of the North and Southeast.

However, this increase in capitalization of votes that the candidate obtained was not enough for her to move on to the second round, because Aécio Neves – her direct adversary in the dispute – managed to revert the disadvantages in time:

Aécio Neves managed to recover himself at the end of the campaign and ended up carrying out maintenance work on the political capital that his party had obtained in the previous election, which guaranteed him a chance to run for the second round against Dilma Rousseff. However, there is an even greater decrease in votes in the North and Northeast areas, in comparison to the results obtained in 2010:
When observing both the results of surveys throughout the campaign period of 2014 and their relation to the final results obtained and compared to candidates in 2010, some relevant aspects may be seen:

i. Dilma Rousseff kept most of her electorate, losing a part of her constituency in the segments where her party has traditionally been weak in the past elections;

ii. Marina Silva, who came head-first into the presidential race, but did not manage to hold her advantage throughout the campaign, left a bit stronger in the segments where she faced the greatest difficulties in comparison to the results of surveys from 2010 and 2014;

iii. Aécio Neves managed to consolidate the profile of Serra’s preferential voter, but still faced difficulties in raising new ones, especially in segments in which his party has greater difficulty in being accepted.

The overall behavior of the electorate, and the referred segments that were analyzed, shows that the first round of the election presented significant mobilization, especially because of the struggle established between Aécio Neves and Marina Silva, with Aécio under the threat of not moving on to the second round of the dispute, but the social democrat candidate recovered an electorate which traditionally belonged to the PSDB, which had temporarily migrated towards a candidate which appeared to be more competitive at the time, but who showed frailty in her propositions and convictions and ended up losing in the last stretch of the electorate of other candidates that had migrated to her side. Aécio managed to remain in the dispute, as well as making this initial moment stronger than when the surveys began, according to the graph below:
And so, the 1st round ended repeating the same logic of the past 20 years, a dispute between the PT and PSDB, and a very similar distribution of voters to that of previous elections – the voting profiles of candidates from PT and from PSDB stayed pretty close to one another, for if we analyze the results of opinion polls and the final results of the TSE (the Superior Electoral Court), it is noticeable that the groups distributed the votes from the 2014 election in a similar way to the results obtained in the 2010 elections, according to what can be seen in the comparative graphs of results seen above.

**The 2nd round and the voter’s profile**

It is possible to analyze the movement of voters during the second round of the 2014 presidential elections within the principle of the Median Voter Theorem, since the behavior presented during the electoral polls that took place during the period shows that the greater mass of the electorate – those who make up the foundation of the median voter – tended to move towards the candidate running for reelection.

But this behavior did not happen in a simple way, or even a calm one. The end of the first round with a victory for Dilma Rousseff did not guarantee the victory’s stability for the second round, since Aécio Neves, the challenging candidate, had come out from the first round greatly strengthened, and showed superior results in the subsequent surveys to those of Dilma in the intent of votes for presidency.
The first poll for voting intentions for presidency carried out in the second round shows that Aécio’s ascending movement continued up until that moment, being evident in the advantage the candidate displayed over Dilma in voting intentions:

![Intention of Vote for Presidency - 2nd Round: 2014 Elections](image)

Source: IBOPE

The equal division of TV and radio time in electoral shows (foreseen in Brazilian electoral legislation for the occasional 2nd round) could be decisive for Aécio, since this would be the appropriate moment for the candidate to present what Downs (1999) calls *party differential*, which would be the possibility of Aécio showing voters the advantages they would have if he was conducted into power. Using this larger exposure in the media, Aécio would have the opportunity to explore a discourse that would draw closer to the demands of the electorate and further show his image as a leader and possible achiever, as well as demonstrate his charisma and his political and personal past, giving greater chances for the electorate to create a more personal relationship with it, amplifying his potential for votes.

This would be the fourth consecutive time that candidates from PT and PSDB faced each other in the 2nd round of a presidential dispute.

**The return of the non-departed**

Finishing up the first round of the election, Dilma managed to imprint a significant victory over her adversaries, remaining 9 percentage points ahead of Aécio Neves, placed second. However, the certainty of a similar victory in the second round was threatened, since a good deal of voters that didn’t previously vote for Dilma migrated towards Aécio Neves, especially those who claimed to have voted for Marina Silva, as seen in the table below:
At this moment of the electoral dispute, a shift occurred on behalf of voters towards candidate Aécio Neves, especially among those who declared having voted for Marina Silva. This made several analysts and journalists consider the possibility of defeat for the candidate for reelection, with Aécio’s favorable condition in the polls, and this demanded a greater effort from reelection candidate Dilma’s campaign team to recover the advantage that had been acquired in the first round.

However, as it can be analyzed, the challenging candidate failed to stay ahead of the candidate for reelection during the remainder of the electoral race, even though he had conditions that gave him more exposure time, as described earlier. The tactics adopted by Dilma Rousseff seemed to have been more effective than those of her opponent. She also decided to adopt a more aggressive speech against her challenger, with special focus on the historical past of his party – Aécio Neves was a candidate for the Brazilian Social Democratic
Party (PSDB), a party that ruled Brazil between the years of 1994 and 2002, twice electing Fernando Henrique Cardoso, with both victories conquered in the first round, against Lula, of the Workers’ Party – and which had left the federal government in a rather adverse situation back in 2002, because they had reduced and controlled inflation, but could not manage to solve problems related to unemployment, interest rates, the access to credit or to effectively widen the actions of social programs, such as income distribution, reinsertion of the working class through access to credit and higher education through federal programs, also taking on the stigma of privatizers, claiming that if the challenging candidate was the winner, aside from ending social programs created and consolidated during the terms the PT was in office, it would also bring back the policy of privatization of Brazilian state-owned companies.

The adoption of this type of speech, added to the distribution of pieces that symbolize the return to that past and the renewed speech referring to the achievements of Dilma’s government seemed to have had a lot more effect than the attacks and propositions presented in the campaign of Aécio Neves. It is much safer to state that the candidate stood out during the debates promoted by television companies than by the electoral program his campaign developed for the second round.

As a result of that pressure exerted by Dilma Rousseff, and just as it had happened with Marina, Aécio failed to perform on the same level, and lost part of the strength he had acquired at the end of the first round, with a part of voters that had shifted towards his constituency and went back to that of the candidate for reelection:
Comparing the evolutions by segment, the movement presented by the voter throughout the electoral campaign can be noticed during the second round, especially within some segments.
segments that even validate a possible social division of the vote, in view that there is a division in every group, making it visually antagonistic. However, it is possible to evaluate that while Dilma was consolidated in the segments that were the most impacted by public policies developed by the federal government and even expanded them (lower school levels, lower income and residing in the north/mid-west and northeast of Brazil), she also increased her electorate potential, which is traditionally linked to the candidate of the PSDB, or otherwise stabilized it (such as those with a higher income – those who declared an income over 5 times the minimum wage increased their intention of vote by 8 percentage points between the first and the last poll of the second round – and the southeast area, which kept the same potential throughout the survey). The reverse movement is also perceived for Aécio, who, aside from failing to gain the support within Dilma’s traditional supporters, saw part of the voters that strengthened his constituency in the beginning of the second round migrate towards his adversary.

This movement is very similar to what happened to Marina Silva, who upon entering the dispute, saw an increase in her constituency, which was later diluted throughout the campaign, and that happened again after the beginning of the campaign for the second round. This movement can be understood as a percentage of voters who voted for Marina Silva – or other candidates – in the first round, and then migrated towards Aécio Neves, but then, either because of a greater identification with the issues defended by Dilma, or as a matter of vote maintenance – better to vote for a candidate that already has an established program and will stick to it than to risk changing without knowing for sure what will really happen -, added points for Dilma Rousseff’s constituency, causing her to prevail once again:

**Brazil: a country divided?**

![Intention of Vote for Presidency in the 2nd Round](image-url)
The literature is consensual regarding the low level of information and the diffuse and ill-structured character of the political opinions of most of the Brazilian electorate. This does not mean however that there is the need to visualize the Brazilian voter's behavior as non-rational (SILVEIRA, 1998). As Castro points out, the Brazilian voter's behavior may “[…] not correspond to an ideologically-oriented citizen deduced from the classic models of democratic politics or to the somewhat idealized image of the politically conscious median European voter” (CASTRO, 1997, p. 166), however, their vote expresses a rationality that is structured starting at the cognitive level of the majority of the Brazilian electorate and which is based on “fluid and diffuse images” of politicians and parties.

Secondly, it is noticed that the decision of vote, for the majority of the electorate, is strongly structured by “political images” and assessments the voter does of a few personal traits of the candidates in dispute.

“Among the most valued attributes for voters, the literature has pointed out a decreased value for images (the people's candidate/ the candidate of the elite, left-wing/ right-wing) and given greater emphasis to attributes such as honesty/integrity and competence/good administrative performance.” (SILVEIRA, 1998, CARREIRÃO, 2000).

Based on these elements, the possible relations established between the typology of the Brazilian voter and the phenomena of political culture and ideology allow us to investigate the causes of the behavior of a majority of the Brazilian electorate, who decide their vote mostly based on personal attributes of the candidate, such as competence and honesty.

Since the redemocratization of Brazilian politics, which came about since 1989, with the military leaving the control of federal government, the country has walked towards political stability, with a healthy electoral realignment into our model of a party-based system. Since then, the Workers’ Party has been present in every presidential dispute, and since 1994, has enrolled in a constant dispute with the PSDB, the party with which they have already had six presidential disputes, with the PSDB emerging victorious on 2 occasions (1994 and 1998) and the PT winning 4 victories (2002, 2006, 2010, 2014).

However, this succession of struggles did not create ideological stability, nor even a pattern of electoral dispute, since the behavior of the electorate has undergone significant changes in the past couple of presidential elections, as noticed by Azevedo (2012) in his article when surveying the results of presidential elections in that period.

One of the great changes of that period is the end of the search for the ideological vote – something that essentially happened in the dispute of 1989, when the dispute was marked
by a strong ideological division between the left and right wings, still having in the background the old scenario of a struggle between socialism and capitalism – and the start of a certain social division of the vote, an argument that has been used ever since PT and PSDB started to polarize the presidential disputes “with both parties fighting over the electorate of the political center and therefore within a logic of confrontation in which ideological division was no longer relevant” (Azevedo, 2012).

The social division onto which the media largely structured itself to describe the outcome of the last election in the country is the fruit of an analysis by journalists and political analysts who based themselves off of results from voting intentions according to the segments, creating a condition of antagonism between voters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile of the PSDB voter</th>
<th>Profile of the PT voter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school levels (high school or higher)</td>
<td>Low school levels (up to 8th grade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income (over 5 times the minimum wage)</td>
<td>Low income (up to twice the minimum wage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-South area</td>
<td>North and Northeast areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, a vision of the electorate was created, which would be purely linked to the socio-economic profile, disregarding the electoral stability that was established after 1990. That is a reductionist view of the political dynamics that occur in the federative units (within and among them), since it is possible to list disparities through several socio-economic indicators and political dynamics that take place within the territory, as pointed out by Bohn and Paiva (2008):

“Aside from socio-economic differences (...), the literature has emphasized the existence of enormous diversities in terms of political dynamics, between subnational units. These present themselves in terms of the configuration and development of political parties and party subsystems, the format of electoral competition, the profile and recruiting process of political elites and the value of federation units in party politics on a national scale” (BOHN and PAIVA, 2008).

Even with the heterogeneity presented between Brazilian areas, as well as within federative units and the municipalities that comprise them, such political stability on a national scale of the electoral dispute is validated by the institutionalization of our party system,
according to what Bohn and Paiva (2008) evaluated in their article about electoral volatility within the states, supported by the theories of Mainwaring and Zoco (2006) and Huntington (1991), looking at Brazilian democracy as a participant of the “third wave of democratization”, being that Brazil became one of Latin America’s countries with the lowest level of electoral volatility starting in 2002. According to the assessment of electoral volatility presented by Bohn and Paiva (2008), Brazil displays a “tendency to decrease electoral volatility”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>54,7</td>
<td></td>
<td>41,0</td>
<td>29,8</td>
<td>30,3</td>
<td>39,0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65,9</td>
<td>64,9</td>
<td>62,0</td>
<td>64,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>38,0</td>
<td>57,8</td>
<td>68,9</td>
<td>52,4</td>
<td>52,1</td>
<td>53,0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
<td>49,9</td>
<td>43,4</td>
<td>35,7</td>
<td>32,3</td>
<td>33,0</td>
<td>27,6</td>
<td>36,9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Assembly</td>
<td>39,9</td>
<td>42,1</td>
<td>28,4</td>
<td>29,8</td>
<td>26,2</td>
<td>29,5</td>
<td>32,7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Besides, if results from the past presidential elections published by the TSE are taken into account, that vote stability can be pointed out:
According to what has happened since 2002, the scenario for the final struggle was repeated once again in 2014, after a near change thanks to the inclusion of Marina Silva into the dispute (bearing in mind that the candidate reached second place in the polls, but failed to hold that position), and PT and PSDB competed in the second round in a much fiercer competition and with a different result from the previous ones, where candidates from the Workers’ Party won with a certain advantage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PSDB Candidate</th>
<th>PT Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With a slightly different situation from the rest, there were people who speculated that the candidate for PT had only won the election because of the assistencialism promoted by the government in areas with a greater penetration of social programs, especially Bolsa Família, something that happens on a large scale in the Brazilian Northeast.

This fact once again fostered the idea of an assistencialist vote; even creating regional tension and feeding some hate speeches (elected state representative Colonel Telhada (PSDB-SP) defended the independence of the South and Southeast because of that). Of course the performance of Dilma Rousseff (PT) in the Northeast was crucial for her victory: the candidate had 20 million votes in the 2nd round, equivalent to 72% of the total valid votes in the area. But the reelected president had reasonable support in all of the five areas. The smallest percentage of valid votes came from the South: the support of 41% of voters who picked a candidate.

The wrong impression that the Northeast alone is mostly responsible for reelecting Dilma is strengthened when the electoral map is seen with states painted in the color of whoever had the highest percentage of votes there. On this map, half of Brazil appears painted blue, as if that territory had gone in a completely opposite direction from the other half, painted red.
In fact, out of the ten States in which Dilma had the lowest amount of votes, only three are in these areas: Santa Catarina, São Paulo and Paraná. All of the others are in the North or Mid-West. Visually, one can see how the support for Dilma spreads across Brazil in the relief graph – none of the two highest “mountains” that represent the absolute number of votes is in the Northeast:

Which means, besides achieving a great results in the North and Northeast areas, Dilma had a significant amount of votes in the areas where Aécio had a better outcome, with the absolute distribution of votes pointing out that the reelection of Dilma Rousseff happened mostly because of her good performance in the Southeast area than because of the votes she got from the Northeast areas. Even though Aécio Neves won in three areas, Dilma’s good outcome in the Southeast – especially Minas Gerais and Rio, added to the votes obtained from São Paulo – and the weak results that came from the Northeast were crucial for the candidate to be reelected.

Another important factor to be considered for the voting results is the issue of voting potential and the declared rejection of candidates, which were observed in surveys carried out by IBOPE throughout the election. One way to measure that was by asking the interviewed voters what were the chances of them actually voting for the candidates that were running for presidency, regardless of the declared vote. The results seen showed very different behaviors from the electorate regarding the chance of voting (potential) or not (rejection) for one of the candidates.

While in aspects like the voting potential and the lack of knowledge of the candidate’s image, Aécio Neves oscillated in a positive way – increasing the first and decreasing the second, the candidate’s voting rejection was quite present, even presenting an increase in the final stretch of the election:
Dilma Rousseff also presented considerably high percentages of rejection. However, these percentages remained stable throughout all of the verified period, even presenting a reduction in the final stretch of the campaign. At the same time, her potential vote suffered no oscillations, staying always above 50%, and increasing in the last polls as seen below:

Even though Aécio came out stronger at the end of the 1st round of the election, the strategies adopted by Dilma Rousseff’s campaign to attack Aécio Neves, especially those that associated the candidate’s propositions to the period of his political godfather, former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (such as the lack of investment in social programs, a program of privatizing state-owned companies, devaluing currency, among other things), somehow affected his image. This became clear in the results regarding the candidates’ potential and rejection of votes since in every survey the potential of votes decreased and the rejection towards the candidate increased – the opposing, positive effect happened for Dilma.
Two important considerations can be observed: the first is that the factor of social benefits was not the only thing for Dilma Rousseff’s reelection, since the percentage of respondents that declared voting for the candidate and who had no benefits was almost the same as those who declared voting for Aécio overall:

The second, it wasn’t just the less wealthy voters who voted for Dilma, voters with a higher income in the N/MW and NE areas also had a larger tendency to vote for the candidate, as well as voters from other income levels:
This means that the victory of Dilma Rousseff, despite being a closer call than the previous one – and than previous ones achieved by the Workers’ Party – is indisputable from the electoral standpoint, since the candidate did better than her competitor in areas where she suffered setbacks. Such setbacks did not have enough impact to give an advantage to her adversary, and once again a candidate for PT was deemed victorious.

Conclusion

Dilma Rousseff went into this election as a favorite, a condition expressed by the proportion of voters who declared their vote for the president since before the campaign, where the achievement of an amount of average voters that was enough to guarantee her reelection was already seen. The question put forth at the beginning of this work, regarding the doubts raised at that time about the conditions she would need in order to maintain this political and electoral heritage, leveraged mostly by the high levels of popularity of her predecessor and tutor, former president Lula; by the improvement in quality of life experienced by the poorer population, with an accented decrease of historical social inequalities in our country;

Not only the outcome of this election, which resulted in Dilma’s reelection, but primarily the analysis of movements occurred in the voting intentions declared in countless surveys carried out immediately after the events with the greatest potential to remove voters from her constituency – the rise of Marina after the death of Eduardo Campos, and later the migration of these votes towards Aécio Neves, who closed the first round in an ascending trajectory – showed that Dilma kept the proportion of voters at all times.

The average voter did not see in Marina a person with the overall structure and conditions to rule the country, though they may have been dazzled by the possibilities of change that were assured, be it due to the difficulty in understanding how the exercise of the much promised “new policy” would happen; be it due to the contradictions and apparent conflicts in which the candidate got involved or was involved; be it due to the perceived frailty – real or not – in the final stretch of the first round.

Aécio, in his turn, was not sufficiently convincing to present himself as an alternative to the government plan of the PT, be it due to not achieving the construction, along with his party, of a consistent and articulate opposition throughout Dilma’s first term; be it due to not showing himself as a better alternative than the one occupying the position to reassume the rhythm of social achievements the she and her predecessor promoted.

Even the accusations of corruption involving agents of the government and the Worker’s Party (alongside various other parties mentioned) did not constitute enough elements to demote Dilma’s voters from their intent. In fact, there is a prevailing impression that this voter had long ago weighed all of the pros and cons of trusting the continuity of the country’s command to Dilma, and rejected all of the negative news and events that surfaced throughout the campaign.

In fact, the votes that Marina received and that later migrated to Aécio seemed to represent mostly anti-Dilma or anti-PT voters, rather than voters who sympathized with their
candidacies. These would be volatile votes, which would go to the candidate they deemed more capable of defeating Dilma, but which ultimately were not sufficient for that.

Marina could not hold the anti-PT votes and these, for Aécio, were not enough for him to be elected because the candidate failed to go beyond these votes and conquer voters who in fact had already made up their minds about voting for Dilma. These voters, the median voters, had already been conquered by Lula in his first term, and they stuck to that option in his second term and Dilma's first term and, despite noticing the government's difficulties in halting the decrease of economic activity, which could mean a loss of the advances and benefits noticed with these terms, chose to place a vote of confidence in the president, guaranteeing her reelection.

**Post scriptum**

Though unforeseen in the original proposition of this work, but due to the fact that the country currently has a mood of opinions that are quite different from the final outcome of the election, to the point that some intend to consider that it is still not over, and that we would be living out a “third round”, we deemed it opportune to list here some of the events that happened from that clip up until this exact moment:

**The 2014 post-election**

After the 2014 election, a series of events take place that cause the scenario that was relatively favorable for Dilma Rousseff until that point, to change into a complete inhospitable terrain. We have listed below some of the events that contributed to that change:

- Right after the election, the PSDB, the party of Aécio Neves, who was defeated in the second round, asks for an audit of the results of the 2014 election, which was carried out in electronic voting machines (a measure that apparently has no negative effects for Dilma);

- In the end of 2014, the Federal Government creates a proposition that makes it harder to access workers’ rights such as salary allowance and unemployment aid in an attempt to contain government spending (to apply for the benefit, the citizen must have worked on the job for at least 18 months);

- Catering to demands, President Dilma Rousseff changes her economic team, known for being a heterodox model, to a team with a more orthodox thought – the model defended by the key opposing party, the PSDB – and led by a minister with no political history, but praised by the financial market. This fact rendered several critiques from her electoral constituency;

- During her acceptance speech, President Dilma Rousseff speaks out in defense of labor rights, tax adjustments and Petrobras;
- In January 2015, the Federal Government announces a pack of tax increases as well as an end to subsidies for companies and consumers; she follows that with an increase in the price of fuel;

- In February 2015, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB – RJ), of the government’s constituency, seen as disliked by the Government due to being one of the key critics to Dilma’s government, wins the dispute for the presidency of the House of Representatives and proceeds to strengthen the key motto of his campaign, which is the “independence” between the Legislative and Executive powers;

- President Dilma Rousseff settles the dismissal of Graça Foster from the presidency of Petrobrás, amidst a corruption-related crisis. Foster went down after an assessment went public showing that losses with corruption had a negative impact of almost 90 billion reais in the assets of Petrobrás. Aldemir Bendine, then president of Banco do Brasil, is named the new president of the state-owned company;

- The attorney general to the Republic, Rodrigo Janot, sends requests to the STF (Federal Supreme Court) to open investigations against dozens of politicians mentioned in Operation Carwash (an operation put together by the Federal Police to investigate a big corruption scheme involving Petrobrás, contractors and politicians). Several names of the government and important politicians figured among those indicted;

- In March 2015, Dilma makes an announcement on national television about International Women’s Day, on the 8th. The reaction from part of the population of major cities, especially in middle class neighborhoods, included banging on pots and asking for the President to resign;

- On March 13th, several social entities scheduled protests all over the national territory. The acts, christened as the National Day of Struggles, were initially summoned to defend Petrobrás and criticize the tax adjustments announced by Dilma in the previous months. But the left-wing movements also march in defense of democracy – or against a supposed attempt at an impeachment with no appropriate legal basis – and political reform;

- On March 15th, a Sunday, organized protests took place against Dilma Rousseff’s government, taking large quantities of people out into the streets in all Units of the Federation, asking for everything from efforts against corruption to the impeachment and military intervention in the country. The greatest concentration happens in the capital of the State of São Paulo, with the presence of approximately one million people, according to the State’s Military Police;

- The Minister of Social Communication, Thomas Traumann, resigns, one week after the website estadao.com.br reveals the contents of a document in which the minister points out that the Federal Government’s communication is done in a “wrong” and “erratic” way and the situation of “political chaos”, among other critiques;

- Recent economic data proves a growing weakness in the economy. In March, the official inflation- measured by the IPCA (Consumer Price Index) – went up 1.32% in March and hit
8.13% in 12 months, well above the goal’s limits of 6.5%. The OCDE (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) projects negative growth in the Brazilian GDP for 2015;

- In April 2015, a research by IBOPE / CNI is publicized in which the evaluation of the Federal Government reaches its lowest point in the last 26 years. Dilma Rousseff’s administration is considered bad or terrible by 64% of the population, equaling the “record” of former president José Sarney in 1989 – another 23% of the population evaluate the administration as regular and 12% deem it to be great/good;

- Dilma Rousseff, amidst a crisis in the support of her allied constituency, suspends Minister Pepe Vargas, her party colleague in PT, from the Secretary of Institutional Relations and hands over the political articulation of the administration to vice-president Michel Temer (PMDB in an attempt to halt the conflicts with presidents of the Senate, who belong to the same party as the vice-president;

- The House of Representative approves the initial text of the project that regulates outsourcing in the job market. Among the parties in the constituency, only the PT and PC do B vote against it; PMDB, an allied party with the second largest seating (only losing to that of PT), votes in favor of the project.

- A new national protest in the streets happens on April 12th, albeit with a much smaller participation than the one on March 15th. This time, the focus was exclusively towards making the opposing parties and Congress approve the request for an impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff.

REFERENCES


