Marina Silva’s unique trajectory as a candidate for President of Brazil:
The hope of a new politics

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Abstract: Born in Acre-BR, Marina Silva had to work from childhood, which rendered impossible her getting into school, having her first studies when she was already 16 years old. Letting go of the dream of becoming a Nun, she devoted entirely to the social struggle side by side to the union-leader Chico Mendes. At 30 years old, joined to the leftist Workers Party (PT), she was elected Councilor for Rio Branco. Two years later, she was elected State Representative for Acre, and in 1994, at 36 years old, she became the youngest Republic Senator in the country’s history. During President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's administration, she was appointed as Minister of the Environment, giving to continuity to her work on the environmental preservation. For the Green Party, in 2010 Elections, for the first time, Marina ran for President of the Republic, ranked third in the dispute, getting almost twenty million votes. After having the registry of the party that was being created, Sustainability Network, denied by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), Marina joins Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), so that she could run the 2014 elections. Thus, she became a candidate for the vice-presidency under Eduardo Campos. However, a tragedy marked the 2014 elections: the death of Campos in a plane crash. Marina then took over, becoming, once more, a presidential candidate. She ended the dispute in third position again, getting approximately twenty-two million votes. In a political context apparently very favorable to her, following the death of Eduardo Campos, she presented a very positive performance in the pre-electoral polls at the start of the presidential race, having fluctuated negatively and gradually, and losing ground to her main opponent, Aécio Neves. In this sense, considering the peculiarity of Marina Silva’s life story, this study aims to analyze the path of the candidate in the presidential elections in which she contested for the major post, aiming to understand, specially, her performance in the 2014 elections.
1. Introductory part

Marina Silva was born in the State of Acre, at February 8th 1958. In poor conditions, she had a difficult childhood, full of household chores, working at rubber plantation to help providing financially her family. At age of 16, when she contracted hepatitis – after having contracted malaria for five times – she asked her father to go to the capital Rio Branco for medical treatment and, also, both to devote to the religious life (as because of the religious teachings of her grandmother, she dreamt of being a nun) and to the studies (she had to be literate, because, as her grandmother used to say, there were no illiterate nuns). Arriving in Rio Branco, she lived first with relatives and worked as a housemaid, so she could provide for herself. She joined the convent and initiated her studies. In a period of ten years, Marina has learned how to read and write, besides graduating in History from the Federal University of Acre.

Influenced by the Archbishop Moacyr Grecchi, an important leader at the time, and aligned to the theory current called Liberation Theology1, she decided to attend the Rural Syndical Leadership Course, applied by the theologian and by the union-leader Chico Mendes. Her devotion for social struggles and her position against the social injustice and being in favor of the re-democratization of the country made Marina give up the dream of becoming a nun, to so dedicate entirely to the social struggle. Marina, such as Chico Mendes, joined PRC (Revolutionary Communist Party), a clandestine Marxist organization, which culminated, for some, in breaking the connection she had with the Catholic Church. About that, states the journalist Toinho Alves:

When Marina joined PRC, she already did it breaking her connections with the Church, because church did not encourage these communist-materialist groups; on the contrary. If they discovered that within the Basic Christian Community there was a communist joined to some left party, the person could be even waived from them. The Church only accepted their own communists; they didn’t want communists from other parties (CÉSAR, 2010, p. 95)

Marina was one of those responsible for the foundation of CUT (Central Workers Union Confederation), in Acre, in 1984, actively participating in the activities of the

1 To learn more about the Liberation Theology, see: https://leondoboff.wordpress.com/2011/08/09/quarenta-anos-da-teologia-da-libertacao/, accessed on 03/01/2015, at 06:38 PM.
institution, acting as a vice-coordinator and right-hand woman of the coordinator Chico Mendes. Joined PT in 1985, and the next year for the first time competed for a public office. Even getting a high percent of voting, she was not elected as Federal Representative, whereas her party did not reach the minimum electoral coefficient required. However, in 1988, Marina was elected Councilor for Rio Branco, capital of the State of Acre, and in 1990, at 32 years old, she was elected Federal Representative. Only four years later, Marina Silva was elected Senator – the youngest in the country’s history – with 64,436 votes\(^2\) (it is noteworthy that Marina came out as a candidate for the Senate just because there was no one within the party willing to run the post. According her biography, she herself believed that there was no way to her to be elected, and so she would leave the public affairs with honor). She was reelected in 2002, getting 157,588 nominal votes\(^3\). As an example of her performance in the Federal Senate, may be mentioned the law project that aimed to ensure the sustainable use of the biological diversity on Amazonia, ensuring the patent rights to the indigenous and native people (project since 2007 awaiting decision of the House of the Representatives). There were also projects that predict the creation of a fund for supporting the extraction works in the Amazon (filed in the end of the legislature) and the creation of a fund of participation of the States and Federal District, to federal regions covered in their territory, nation conservation units and demarcated indigenous lands (also filed in the end of the legislature)\(^4\). In a general way, Marina brought visibility to the environmental issues during her two terms as a Senator. However, many of these issues raised by her did no progress.

Furthermore, the political stance of Marina in this area has changed over time. If in the beginning of her journey, the socialist direction provided that the forest exploitation and the domination of the territory of Acre were controlled by the local producers and rubber tappers, later, it assumes the discourse of the “sustainable development”, that is, economic development based on the capitalist model of production. For the professor of the Federal University of Acre, Elder Andrade, Marina became “pragmatic”, breaking with the initial dream of Chico Mendes (CÉSAR, 2010, p. 103).


\(^3\) Available on http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores/eleicoes-2002/resultado-da-eleicao-2002, accessed on 02/05/2015, at 11:00 AM.

\(^4\) In order to consult the law projects presented by Marina Silva as a senator, see: http://wwwсенадо.gov.br/atividade/materia/Consulta_Parl.asp?intPag=1&str_tipo=PLS&RAD_TIP=PLS&Tipo_Cons=15&p_cod_senador=59&FlagTot=1&orderby=6, accessed on 03/16/2015, at 05:05 PM.
In 2003, she was invited by the President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, at the beginning of his first term, to assume the Ministry of the Environment, because of her experience in the area in the Senate. Marina was a Minister during five years and four months, acting incisively and bringing visibility to some issues regarding to environmental preservation, such as global warming, deforestation and sustainable development. It should be noted that the concern with the environment in Brazil was given official recognition as of the decade of 1930, with the creation of the first Brazilian Forest Code in 1934, which combined the land regulation and environmental preservation. In parallel, national parks were created, aiming at the need of refrain disarmament processes. However, the developmental polices implemented over the period refrained occurring significant progress in the area. However, in 1972, the United Nations organized its first environmental conference, in Stockholm, being this an important first step to the creation of the Special Secretariat of Environment (SEMA) in Brazil, as well as the development of small groups such as the Gaúcha Association for Environmental Protection, (AGAPAN). In the decade of 1980, important organizations such as the National Environmental System (SISNAMA), the National Environment Council (CONAMA) and the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Natural Resources (IBAMA) were also created. But the concern with the environment became more present on people’s daily lives in Brazil after the global meeting on environment ECO-92, which took place in Rio de Janeiro, in 1992. Thus, the Agenda 21 was produced, with the recognition of the sustainable development concept, by the participating countries, and the conservation of biological diversity. It was on ECO-92 that the discussions on the combating the greenhouse effect began, originating later the Kyoto Protocol.

When taking up her position as a Minister in 2003, Marina brought herself to sensitive matters which caused a great deal of controversy even within the government itself, such as the transposition of São Francisco River, the deforestation in the Amazon and the transgenic food. Once negotiating with the governors of the States of Amazon and operating together with other ministries, the Action Plan for the Control and Prevention of Deforestation in the Amazon was implemented, leading to a significant decrease in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: from 27 thousand square kilometers in 2004 to almost 13 thousand in 2008\(^5\). The same success, nonetheless, was not reached with the issue of transgenic, existing a clash between the Ministry of the Environment

and the Ministry of Agriculture. It can be said that Marina (who was against the transgenic) lost in this struggle, since Federal Government authorized the use of modified food. This was the first major disagreement between the Minister and the Government to which belonged. In Lula’s second term, the President kept Marina on the front line of the Ministry of the Environment.

On May 13th 2008, Marina Silva resigned from the Ministry, stating she was facing difficulties on implementing the environmental issues, and also that she had trouble to putting these matters in the country’s agenda. Thus, she returns to the Senate, and in August 19th 2009, announces she is leaving the Workers Party. On these two moments, leaving the government and unjoining PT, Marina says about Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva:

I did everything so that the transition was respectful, while saying the truths that had to be said for the good of Amazon and for the government itself. But this indifference thing is too bad. Not only because it affects us as ignored individuals but also because someone who treats the others with indifference reveals something very small in his personality. Even being apart from the government and from PT, I think that I am still trying to help them. (CÉSAR, 2010, p. 144).

Eleven days after asking for her exclusion from the Workers Party, Marina joins the Green Party, historically concerned about the issues related to the environment. In 2010, the official launch of Marina Silva’s candidacy for the Republic Presidency – supported by the Party leaders – is made, pledging to keep the achievements of the previous governments, promoting the sustainable development. By this time, her campaign was into “a new way of doing politics”, thus being one of the three general main lines (besides the equal opportunities and sustainability). The PV candidate, with less than one and a half minute of time in the electoral advertising, ends her participation in the dispute in the third place, reaching almost 20 million votes. But, in the second round, Marina decides to come out in an impartial way, without announcing any support to the two candidates in dispute.

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6 The full text of the Letter of Resignation submitted to then President Lula is available on http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,veja-integra-do-carta-de-demissao-de-marina-silva,172159, accessed on 04/13/2015 at 02:37 PM.
Due to internal divergences with PV’s heads (claiming the need of a debate for an internal restructuring and re-democratization to the party), Marina asks her exclusion from the party on July 7th 2011. On her decision to leave, according to the printed version of the newspaper *O Estado de SP*, from August 24th 2014, creating her own party seemed inevitable after the experience with Green Party, once, according to the newspaper, Marina did not integrate PV and kept her own core. She was accused by some of willing to “be the boss” within the party.

Without any party affiliation, the former Minister came out before important issues that were raised in the following period to her departure from PV, for example, in the debate on the Forestry Code – which caused a big discussion at the time. Marina, as well as some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the environmentalist movement, supported the veto to the new Code, by considering it a step backwards. Similarly, before the wave of violence that scared the farmers from the State of Pará in June 2011, and resulted in the murder of some of them by denouncing illegal deforestation in the region, Marina asserted that the Federal Government has no control over the groups that behave in impunity way in Amazon. Also in 2011, Marina refused the PMDB party invitation, which wanted her affiliation; probably ambitioning part of the political capital of the former Minister bloomed in the 2010 elections. In July of the same year, Marina received the title of Honorary Citizen of Belo Horizonte, in a joint that could build an appropriate alliance between her and Aécio Neves in the 2014 elections.

The former Senator stared a company in the early 2011, and gave several lectures to banks, insurance companies and large corporations, for which she received more than one-and-a-half million reais. She participated in numerous important events taken place in the subsequent period: at the London 2012 Olympic Game, Marina was invited by the Olympic Games Organizing Committee to attend the opening ceremony, flying the Olympic flag high alongside names such as Ban Ki-moon, Muhammad Ali, among others. This fact generated a certain embarrassment, once the presence of the President Dilma Rousseff in the event might have been obfuscated by the tribute paid to Marina Silva.

In this context, it emerged the idea of creating the Sustainability Network, initially named as “Green Movement of Citizenship”\(^{10}\), an ambitious own project of the former

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Minister, guided by the understanding of the need of a “new politics” and of a sustainable economic development. The discussion on this new plan has begun in the year of 2011, thereupon her departure from PV. However, the creation of the Network (name given to suggest the idea of a “net”, which means, of connection between the people), took place effectively in February 16\textsuperscript{th} 2013, during the National Meeting of Pro-Party Network, and it was from that date that started the collecting of signatures across the country to officially register the new party. It was necessary that under eight months the 492 thousand signatures required were collected, which in fact occurred (it is required a minimum amount of signatures to be collected to create a party, and must be equivalent to half a percent – 0.5% – of the votes cast in the last elections for the House of Representatives, discarding the blank and null votes. These signatures must be distributed to at least nine Brazilian States\textsuperscript{11}). The organizers report that a total of 910 thousand signatures were collected, but many of them were discarded by the Network itself. However, even having sent 660 thousand signatures considered valid to the Electoral Registration Offices, many of them were refused without justification. The Sustainability Network also tried that 95 thousand signatures rejected by the electoral registration offices were validated by the Superior Electoral Court, which did not occur, causing that the party registration request was denied, making impossible its creation soon enough for the dispute in 2014 elections. Marina Silva, in interview to Folha/UOL, on February 26\textsuperscript{th} 2013\textsuperscript{12}, affirmed there were two difficulties at that time: a short time to collect the signatures and possible proletarian actions from people that did not intent the creation of the party. Considering these obstacles, the new party should have started the collection of signatures as early as possible and more stringently into the pre-validation processes.

So, unable to run for President for her own party slate, at the meeting held on October 5\textsuperscript{th} 2013, Marina joins Brazilian Socialist Party, which evoked surprise in many, since PSB already had a name for the presidential race: the Pernambuco State Governor, Eduardo Campos. At first, because of Marina’s performance in the political polls carried out during that period (she was in the second position, and more hyped than Campos), there was an expectation of her being the “head of the slate” [expression in Portuguese “cabeça de chapa” that refers to the main candidate of a political party slate or ticket

\textsuperscript{11} More information about the issue, see http://www.tre-mg.jus.br/partidos/criacao-de-partidos/criacao-e-registro-de-partidos-politicos, accessed on 05/02/2015, at 02:43 PM.

that runs for an election, most of the time because he attractive majority of votes], which did not occur. In this context, on July 3rd 2014, Eduardo Campos’ candidature for President and Marina Silva’s as his vice was formalized before the Superior Electoral Court.

At first, the presidential election campaign did not bring big surprises, since it counted with three more robust candidatures and certain stability in the scenario – Dilma Rousseff (PT) appeared in the first position in all polls, Aécio Neves (PSDB) in the second, and Eduardo Campos in the third. But a tragedy marked the presidential race in the year of 2014: the death of the PSB candidate in a plane crash on August 13th, who ended up leaving the dispute in abeyance for a few days.

Soon after the death of Campos, Marina Silva was chosen as his substitute, but not in unanimous way inside PSB (the judgment was that Marina was “passing by” and did not have any political ties with the party and its history). On August 20th 2014, her candidature was formalized, with Beto Albuquerque (PSB/RS) as her vice, but resulted some internal differences, as for example, the regional alliances that were made by Campos and were not accepted by Marina (she did not accept appearing on the PSDB candidates podium), and also the fact that she imposed her reliable persons to participate in the campaign. The criticism that the former Minister was willing “to change” came up again within the party (the same was told at the time of her affiliation to PV) and ended up in the departure of some PSB heads, as the Party Secretary Carlos Siqueira, the Mobilizing Coordinator Milton Coelho and Henrique Costa, being the latter at the head of the finance committee. In the meantime, Marina also loses the support from PSL, which to that time was part of the coalition. PSL questioned whether the former Senator would honor their campaign commitments.

The entrance of Marina as the “head of the slate” for PSB to the presidential race turned the competition more exasperated, since she moved to the second position in the voters’ preference, place that was previously occupied by Aécio Neves: until then, he was the favorite one to face Dilma Rousseff in a possible second round. For reasons that will be treated in details throughout this work, Marina ends up the presidential race in the third place, with a little more than 22 million votes, that is, with a performance at the polls very similar to that obtained in 2010.

The singularity of Marina Silva’ path is observed in every detail, since the difficult childhood, through the adolescence and literacy, to the achievement of the university degree and her spotless performance in the public affairs. Another item that is worthy of
attention is that, in Brazil, it is common some families perpetuate themselves on power, especially in the States and Regions North and Northeast (some names are well known, such as the families Collor, Magalhães, Barbalho, etc. Only in the State of Rio Grande do Norte, it’s three the number of families that dispute the power: Alves, Faria and Maia). Marina, born in the State of Acre, does not build her political history through a surname that brings her support, nor by having financial conditions to that. She walks in contradiction to the political system, the same way contradicted a possible determinism regarding to her future: with everything to live a life with no opportunities, she reversed all perspectives.

2. Objective

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the path of Marina Silva as a candidate for the presidency of Brazil, aiming to understand specially her performance in the 2014 elections: getting almost twenty millions of votes in 2010, Marina came in empowered to the 2014 political dispute as the vice-president in the party slate of Eduardo Campos. After the tragic death of the PSB candidate, she presented real chances of taking her candidature to the second round of the elections, which in fact almost happened.

To understand the ascension movement of her candidature and negative fluctuation during the electoral period of 2014, in an apparently favorable context, the following sections will cover: a brief overview of the Brazilian political context, specific issues of the 2010 and 2014 elections observed through the surveys carried out by IBOPE Intelligence, of Marina’s participation in discussions and news broadcasted about the candidate. Also the data of the survey held by IBOPE Intelligence exclusively for this work, measuring the voting intentions of the Brazilian electorate and the potential of voting of those who ran for the 2014 elections will be presented.

3. Political context: continuity or change?

Considering Brazil’s recent political context considering the presidential elections held since 1989, it can be affirmed that, in a general way, Brazilian people tends more to the continuity than the change. André Singer, in his paper “Lulisms Ideological and Social Origins”, suggests that in the election of Fernando Collor de Mello (PRN) as President of Brazil in 1989, the conservatism of the lower classes of the population was intrinsically
related to the conscious choice of the non-explanation of vote for “left-wing” candidates, justified by the fear of loss of the little guaranties already achieved. Besides Collor being the candidate supported by the press, it is important to note that this was the first election after the period of military regime, which may also help to explain the phenomenon occurred in 1989. Therefore, one can see that Fernando Collor de Mello, chosen by the lower classes, represented the candidate of the continuity at that time.

After the impeachment process, in the late 1992, the Vice-President Itamar Franco (PMDB) took the office. On May 1993, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was appointed to the Finance Ministry, and as a result of his participation elaborating and implementing the Real Plan – and the subsequent economic stability verified in the control of the hyperinflation and price stability – he was elected as President of the Republic, in the first round of the 1994 elections with 55.22% of the valid votes, giving to continuity to the economic policy stablished in the previous govern. With the approval of the constitutional amendment that enabled the reelection for the offices of President, Governor and Mayor, on June 1997, FHC was reelected in the 1998 elections, once again in the first round, with 53.06% of the valid votes.

In the 2002 elections, Lula certainly was not seen as a conservative figure, as he was considered the candidate of the “change”. However, this rating must be weighed. That’s because, when reading in public the “Letter to the Brazilian People”13, Lula assets that “Brazilian people wants to change for good”, but he also highlights the PT’s commitment with the financial market, aiming at calming people down (there were by that time a talk of “fear” with regard to a possible government of Lula, based on the fear of declining the economic stability reached after a long period of hyperinflation, obtained with the Real Plan in Itamar Franco’s management and in the two mandates of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from PSDB). In light of this, even with people willing for a “change”, there were signs that this change would not be that “radical”, and, in the economic sphere, PT’s government would not be, necessarily, a “left-wing” government. Lula defeated the PSDB candidate José Serra, getting an expressive number of votes throughout the country’s territory (Serra obtained the largest number of votes only in the State of Alagoas14). However, according to André Singer, in that election there was not a

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polarization between rich and poor in the preference for one or the other candidate. That was only identified in the 2006 elections, when Lula was reelected: for the first time, the poorest section of the population has elected a candidate considered as a “left-wing” one, fact resulting from several aspects observed during his first mandate that helped the poorest social strata, such as the credit enhancement and also the increase of the minimum wage, unemployment rate decrease, social programs such as Bolsa Família [Family Allowance], among others (it is worth to highlight that in the 1989 elections, when Lula lost the presidential race to Collor, there was also a polarization between poor and rich, but Lula has the preference of the first ones, while Collor had the preference of the other ones).

In 2010, PT launches Dilma Rousseff as candidate for President of Brazil, whose campaign pledge was the continuity of the works set out in the eight years of Lula’s government and the expansion of these projects. A survey carried out by IBOPE Intelligence on February 2010\textsuperscript{15} shows the population’s feelings regarding to the willing for change or continuity in the Federal Government at that time: 34% of the respondents said they wanted full continuity of Lula’s government, when they thought about the next President. Also including the mentions of those who wanted continuity for many things and a few changes, this number reached 63%, almost two-thirds of the voters.

The two main candidates in the 2010 presidential race, Dilma Rousseff and José Serra, in a sense, represented the desire of continuity and political models already set out. Dilma, for being PT’s candidate and that one who would give it to continuity to Lula’s government (whose management enjoyed excellent approval at that time), and Serra, for being PSDB’s candidate (who was in charge four years earlier), and for not having in his politics figure the representation of changing, that is, for being an experienced and active politician in the public affairs since the military period (he also represented a secure option for those who approved the politics from FHC era and for those who wanted the changes in political power. His candidacy served the wishes of those who did not like Lula or PT, or even those who were afraid of Dilma’s inexperience. In addition to these aspects, Serra has a solid career in politics, served terms within the Legislative and Executive power and obtained great results as Minister of Health, which made him to be seen by some as a politician able to govern and advance in important areas for the people).

\textsuperscript{15} Available on \url{http://www.ibope.com.br/pt-br/conhecimento/historicopesquisaeleitoral/Documents/10_02_Tabelas.pdf}, accessed on 02/09/2015 at 11:10 AM.
However, even in the moment context tending more to the continuity, we can pretty much to say that part of the people, although in lesser percentage, wanted a change. In this context, Marina Silva emerges representing an alternative to the PT and PSDB polarity, affirming in her speech that she would bring together the good aspects from FHC and Lula, and having her sustainability and conscious consumption ideas supported also by some intellectuals and artists. Marina ended up the 2010 presidential race in the third position, getting almost twenty million votes. Dilma is elected in the second round with almost 56 million votes, keeping the polarization between rich and poor observed in the election of Lula’s second term (Dilma obtained majority the votes of the poorest people, while Serra showed up among the richest electors) and achieving the PT supremacy in North and Northeast16 regions (by comprising great percentage of the low income population).

But in 2014, the will to change appeared to be more intense among the population. According to the following chart, considering some surveys carried out by IBOPE Intelligence that year, it appears that the references to the alternatives that considered as a change in the next management were over than the references to the alternatives that considered the continuity of Dilma’s government.

Table 1. Change and Continuity – From March to October/2014 (%)

| Source: IBOPE Intelligence |

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- Totally changed the country’s government
- Kept only a few programs, but changed something
- Changed a little bit and gave continuity to a lot
- Gave total continuity to the current government
- Don’t know/Did not respond

It is important to emphasize that the concept of changing is very subjective, and often ambiguous, making difficult to identify the quality of the desired change. One might think the “change” considering some aspects, such as: 1) change in the sense of alternation: a candidate that was already elected, in previous elections, could represent a change to the political scenario; 2) change of attitude: a candidate already known by the population, experienced in the political life, could represent a change, whether came up with a new attitude, new ideas, that is, a new way of governing; 3) change in a sense of innovation: a new candidate, without the defects of the political play-acting. However, regardless of the “concept” aspect of the term, in general, one can say that the feeling of the population at that moment was more of changing than of continuity, that is, there was a total change in the country’s government or that changed a lot of things, but with the maintenance of some programs. In this context, the demonstrations that took place in 2013, initially reclaiming the revocation of the increase of the public transport ticket cost that occurred in some of the Brazilian cities, and then embracing many other staves could help the understanding of the people’s willing by that time. The protests took all over the streets across the whole country and showed the dissatisfaction of the Brazilians regarding to the public services offered, political corruption and the corruption in public bodies, spent with the construction of stadiums for the World Cup that would take place in the country, among others.

Even with a significant portion of the population longing for a “change” in the way of governing the country (totally or partly) towards the next President, Dilma Rousseff is reelected, but with a difference of only 3.4 million votes compared to the second place, Aécio Neves\textsuperscript{17}, keeping the polarization as per income and region previously observed. However, the will to “change” from significant part of the population must be analyzed with particular attention, once, also in the 2014 elections State level, most of the governors were either reelected or succeeded that their candidates were elected\textsuperscript{18}.


4. Marina Silva as a Candidate for President

This section consists of a study of the electorate profile that declared vote in favor of Marina Silva in 2010 and in 2014, recorded in the polls carried out by IBOPE Intelligence in that period, and the analyses of these researches results. The news published in O Estado de SP, better known as “Estadão”, and the candidate participation on televised debates on Rede Bandeirantes de Televisão [Bandeirantes Television Network] and Rede Globo de Televisão [Globo Television Network] also will be studied, besides presenting the results of the first round of 2014 presidential elections, so that the objective proposed by this work can be achieved, if possible.

4.1. Marina Silva’s Voters Profile in the 2010 and 2014 Elections

Complying with the researches carried out by IBOPE Intelligence in 2010, it turns out that Marina stands out in certain segments, such as between those who declared themselves as Protestants. It can be noted that, between these, she presented the best performance among all the leading candidates in the period from August to October 2010 (a growth of 15 percentage points in the segment), while Dilma Rousseff has grown 4 percentage points in the same period, and José Serra moved 6 percentage points back between the Protestants. At that time, in a discussion over abortion, both Dilma and Serra presented controversial speeches (Dilma, years earlier, had stated that she was pro-abortion, but changed her position in 2010. Serra, in turn, always positioned himself against abortion, but the press reported that his wife had already an abortion), which can pretty much explain the preference of the Protestants for Marina, since she herself is a Protestant and always positioned herself against the abortion, but opening space for debate.
It also can be noticed that the higher is the income and education of the respondents, the higher the intention to vote for Marina Silva: the percentages of voting intention in the then PV’s candidate increased when the higher was the family income and education of voters. On the other hand, observing the voting intention of the poorest and least educated, Marina grew by only 4 percentage points in each of these segments, between the research carried out at the end of July and the latter before the first round of the presidential elections.

Table 2. Voting Intention for Marina Silva – From June to October/2010 – By Religion – Catholics vs. Protestants (%)

Table 3. Voting Intentions for Marina Silva – From July to October/2010 – By Education (%)
Table 4. Voting Intentions for Marina Silva – From July to October/2010 – By Income (%)

There are other segments in which Marina Silva showed up, for example, among the younger voters (age groups in the range of 16 to 39 years old). The candidate started the dispute, on July 2010, with relatively similar percentages in all age groups. However, she presented a linear and consistent growth throughout the election, standing out especially among the young people, but also getting to improve her performance among the older. Considering the country’s regions, Marina presented a relatively homogeneous performance throughout the whole presidential race (except in the Northeast), and in the finish line, it was in the Southeast that the candidate stood out more.

In 2014, considering the researchers held by IBOPE Intelligence in that period, compared to the electorate profile, it appears that it is again among the Protestants that Marina gets the highest percentages. However, the candidate oscillated negatively between these throughout the entire election campaign, while Aécio Neves grew by 11 percentage points among the Protestants in the researches carried out between early September and October 2014.
Table 5. Voting Intentions for Marina Silva – From August to October/2014 – By Religion – Catholics vs. Protestants (%)

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<th>Protestants</th>
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<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/02/2014</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/06/2014</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/09/2014</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/12/2014</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2014</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/06/2014</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBOPE Intelligence

It is noted that 2014 follows the same pattern of 2010, i.e., the higher the income and education of the respondent, the higher is the intention to vote for Marina Silva. However, in 2014 her electorate became more homogeneous, since they no longer concentrated a greater amount of votes in these segments. This may be due to several factors, including the fact that she became better known and also to become a candidate due to the death of another candidate (in a moment of big commotion). So it appears that in both elections Marina and PSDB candidates stood out in preference of that electorate, and in 2014 the PSB candidate eventually lost space between them for her opponent Aécio Neves during the campaign (Dilma Rousseff also got the votes of the more educated and richer voters, but in much lower proportion compared to the voting intentions of the lower classes, who mostly chose the PT candidate). However, even having turned her voters profile more homogeneous, Marina failed to stand out well among the voters of the lower classes, showing a decline of 12 percentage points in a month (early September and early October) among the less educated – at the same time, considering the same period, Aécio Neves grew by 9 percentage points in this segment.
Table 6. Voting Intentions for Marina Silva – From August to October/2014 – By Education (%)

![Graph showing voting intentions by education from August to October/2014](image)

Source: IBOPE Intelligence

Table 7. Voting Intentions for Marina Silva – From August to October/2014 – By Income (%)

![Graph showing voting intentions by income from August to October/2014](image)

Source: IBOPE Intelligence

As in 2010, it is among the youngest that Marina Silva is more prominent, especially among those aged in the range of 16-34 years old. However, even among these, Marina lost space along the election. In the Brazilian regions at the beginning of the presidential race, Marina performed well in the Northeast (unlike her 2010 performance), possibly because of her association with the Pernambucan Eduardo Campos. Nevertheless, she
receded significantly throughout the election. A stronger movement occurred in the South region: Marina has got an outstanding performance at early September (40% of the vote intentions), dramatically receding thereafter. In other regions, the downward trend remained, but not to such an extent.

Table 8. Voting Intentions for Marina Silva – From August to October/2014 – By Region (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>08/02/2014</th>
<th>08/09/2014</th>
<th>08/15/2014</th>
<th>08/22/2014</th>
<th>08/29/2014</th>
<th>09/05/2014</th>
<th>09/12/2014</th>
<th>09/19/2014</th>
<th>09/26/2014</th>
<th>10/03/2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central-West</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Southeast</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBOPE Intelligence

Regarding the race/color of the skin declared by the respondents, it is noted that the former Minister performs best among those who declared themselves whites and other races. However, the downward trend was stronger among whites, as it was registered a decline of 18 percentage points between these in a month (from 36% in early September to 18% in early October). It is worth noting that Dilma showed the best performance among whites, but Aécio Neves also stood out during the campaign and eventually overcome Marina by 12 percentage points in the last survey in this segment. Among those who declared themselves brown/black, Dilma is the preferred candidate, possibly because of the policy of quotas and social inclusion measures held in her governance.
4.2. A Study of the campaigns of Marina Silva in 2010 and 2014

4.2.1. Analyses of the news published in the newspaper *O Estado de SP*

This stage of the work consists of the study of the news published in the printed version of the newspaper *Estadão*, which had the name of the candidate for Presidency Marina Silva in the front cover of the issue. So the issues between July 5th 2010 (the day of the formalization of the candidatures by the political parties) and October 3rd 2010 (Election Day), in a total of 13 issues, were analyzed. Regarding to 2014, the issues between August 20th (date when the candidature of Marina Silva was formalized by PSB) and October 5th (Election Day), in a total of 13 issues, were analyzed.

In a general way, analyzing the content of the news published in *Estadão* in 2010, it follows that the presidential race ran “smoothly” for Marina Silva. Some questions raised (such as the fact that she did not leave the government nor PT at the time of the scandal that became known as “Mensalão”, or the difficulty she would find in governing, as her party has not formed alliances) were been little explored by the other candidates, once the dispute was polarized between the PT candidate, Dilma Rousseff, and the PSDB candidate, José Serra. Actually, it was Marina who raised some controversial issues, especially in the televised debate held by Rede Record de Televisão [*Record Network of Television*] on September 26th 2010, when she invested in against Serra (raising information on his term as Governor of São Paulo) and against Dilma (with information
on the management of the candidate at the head of the Minister of the Civil House) – in this debate, Serra and Dilma have chosen not to come into confrontation. In late September, while the PT candidate struggled against the fall of her lead in dispute and the PSD candidate preferred use caution (avoiding to criticize Marina, considering the possibility of a second round and the support of the Green Party candidate), Marina attacked both candidates, stimulated for her good performance in the polls.

However, considering the news published in the printed version of Estadão in 2014, we have a totally different situation, both by the performance of the former Minister in 2010 elections and by her performance in the polls carried out before the formalization of Eduardo Campos’ candidacy (in the questions on voting intentions for President, Marina ranked second in the preference of the electorate). The choice of the former Minister as Vice of Campos, unable to be launched as a candidate by her own party, was to just enhance the candidacy of him, but after his death, the announcement of the choice of Marina came as the threat that she represented to the opponents and forced them to create new strategies. In the newspaper’s issue of August 26, for the first time it appears that both Aécio as Dilma invested to contain the Marina’s “wave”, and that both candidates said the former Minister had no administrative experience to govern the country. Other public figures – as Aloysio Nunes, Vice in the party slate of Aécio Neves, and the former Governor of São Paulo, Alberto Goldman – have adopted very similar speeches. In the debate held by Rede Bandeirantes de Televisão [Bandeirantes Television Network], also on August 26, the PSDB candidate tried to deconstruct the idea of a “new politics” presented by the candidate, whose strategy was used, in fact, throughout the race. The next day, the same candidate began investing in what he called “contradictions” of the presidential candidate Marina, as she said she wanted to govern with both former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso as with former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (who are political opponents). The discourse of a “new politics” began to be questioned, since Marina seemed to reject and accept politicians from the same party, without showing a criterion for selecting the partners. She claimed that would govern with the “best”, but did not explain how it would be this government.

While Marina Silva stood out in the polls, Dilma’s campaign came to disqualify the political discourse of the former Minister, questioning whether the candidate would have the strength to negotiate support from the Congress. A PT propaganda linking the figure of Marina Silva to the former Presidents Jânio Quadros and Fernando Collor de Mello was broadcast on TV, stating that, like them, the candidate could not complete the term,
in the case she were elected. Later, Aécio Neves said that “new adventure will not be good to Brazil”\(^\text{19}\) (in this case, simultaneously investing against Dilma Rousseff), also appropriating from the “discourse of fear” against Marina. In the \textit{Estadão} issue of September 5\(^{th}\), it states that PT had set up a task force to deconstruct the candidacy of the former Senator. In the issue of September 12\(^{th}\), the headline says “PT tries to get maximum wear in the 1\(^{st}\) round”\(^\text{20}\) and in the article, the newspaper says that the goal of PT was “bleeding” as much as they could the PSB candidate. One of the most important aspects in this strategy was to suggest the submission of presidential candidate to the bankers, once the candidate supported the autonomy of the Central Bank (the argument was also used due to the fact that Marina had in her campaign the participation of advisers associated with banks, for example, Neca Setubal, one of Itaú bank’s successor). It was aired a propaganda produced by the Workers Party in which the announcer stated that the body’s autonomy would give great power of decision to the banks on the lives of Brazilians. At the same time, the film showed the image of supposed laidback bankers making decisions in a meeting and a family sitting at the table, with food and other items disappearing. Another onslaught from PT, which also appeared in a commercial for television, was the questioning of the policy adopted by the former Minister for the pre-salt exploration\(^\text{21}\), which said that if Marina was elected, there would be a loss of R$ 1.3 trillion reais. These topics were explored so much by the campaign of Dilma Rousseff against Marina Silva.

Also on this movement of deconstruction of the PSB candidate, Aécio Neves said:

“We need to know if the candidate Marina is the one who embraced agribusiness or the one who proposed banning the cultivation of GMOs in the country. If it is Marina that today defends the economic policy of PSDB, even beyond what we imagine suitable as the autonomy of the Central Bank, or Marina from PT, back there, who fought the Real Plan and voted against the Fiscal Responsibility Law”.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{19}\) According to the newspaper \textit{O Estado de SP}, issue of September 4\(^{th}\) 2014, page A8.
\(^{20}\) According to the newspaper \textit{O Estado de SP}, issue of September 12\(^{th}\) 2014, page A7.
\(^{21}\) The term pre-salt refers to a set of rocks located in the marine portions of large part of the Brazilian coast, with the potential for the generation and accumulation of oil. It is usually called pre-salt because it forms a rock range that extends under an extensive layer of salt, which in certain areas of the coast reaches thicknesses of up to 2,000m. The term “pre” is used because, over time, these rocks have been deposited before the layer of salt. The total depth of such rocks, which is the distance between the sea surface and the oil reservoir below the salt layer, can reach more than 7 thousand meters. [http://www.petrobras.com/pt/energia-e-tecnologia/ fontes-de-energia/pre-sal/](http://www.petrobras.com/pt/energia-e-tecnologia/ fontes-de-energia/pre-sal/)
\(^{22}\) According to the newspaper \textit{O Estado de SP}, issue from September 12th 2014, page A9.
Aécio has tried, for several times, associate Marina Silva to PT, once the presidential candidate started to build her political career within that party. With this discourse, the PSDB candidate wanted to show the voters that Dilma and Marina were similar, and that he was the real opposition. In short, both candidates, Dilma Rousseff and Aécio Neves, strove to discredit the former Minister, exploring weak points of her campaign and her position towards some issues. This fierce clash against Marina had not occurred in 2010.

4.2.2. Analyses of Marina Silva’s participation in debates

The political debates were held by Rede Bandeirantes de Televisão [Bandeirantes Television Network], (for being the first televised debate between the presidential candidates) and by Rede Globo de Televisão [Globo Television Network], (for being the last one before the elections). The Rede Bandeirantes debates took place on August 5th 201023 and August 26th 201424. On the other hand, Globo TV debates took place on September 30th 201025 and October 2nd 201426.

The first debate in 2010, held by Rede Bandeirantes de Televisão [Bandeirantes Television Network], was eagerly awaited, since for the first time Dilma Rousseff, candidate as Lula’s successor, and José Serra, a PSDB experienced candidate, would clash. The event was attended by the presidential candidates Dilma Rousseff (PT), José Serra (PSDB), Marina Silva (PV) and Plínio de Arruda Sampaio (PSOL). This debate, besides allowing the candidates to be sitting or walk across the stage if they wished, also allowed for the first time the participation of the Internet users. The meeting took place smoothly, polarized specially by the candidates Serra and Dilma. There was not a topic guiding the discussions, just as well as any difficult or tense moments. Marina showed preparation and clarity to answer the questions. In the final considerations, she recited a poem, written by herself, in tribute to a boy she met when visited a community in Recife.

23 Available on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_6pT6__p7I&list=PL7AD2B29E9BA4F0EE, accessed on 03/28/2105 at 03:00 PM.
24 Available on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPAMXAxq-K-Qk, accessed on 04/01/2015 at 05:33 PM.
25 Available on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qMqq_3OHF Q, accessed on 04/01/2015 at 04:08 PM.
26 Available on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpliALqQg8A, accessed on 04/01/2015 at 06:15 PM.
In the last debate before the election, held by Rede Globo [Globo Television Network], – with the participation of such candidates for Presidency of the first meeting – the main point to note was the decision of the presidential candidates José Serra and Dilma Rousseff to not confront. Throughout the whole debate, even when they could ask questions to each other, they decided to ask the other candidates. It is worth to highlight that the “combination” between Serra and the other candidates turned out to “benefit” both parties, since there was a question with a problem or an attack aimed at Lula’s administration that was corroborated by another candidate, that is, did not give the opportunity for the situation’s candidate Dilma Rousseff to list the achievements of PT government. Similarly, this strategy was also explored by Dilma, as she made several references to the “previous government” (from PSDB’s Fernando Henrique Cardoso) preventing a positioning of Serra, then PSDB candidate. The debate also took place smoothly without moments of great tension. Both in the debate carried out by Rede Bandeirantes as the Globo’s, it is very difficult to say that either candidate “won” the confrontation, since they all remained at the same level (some of them more eloquent than the others), and there was not a candidate who stood out or made more consistent proposals.

In 2014, in the debate held by Rede Bandeirantes [Bandeirantes Television Network], there was an increase in the number of participants. Dilma Rousseff (PT), Aécio Neves (PSDB), Marina Silva (PSB), Eduardo Jorge (PV), Luciana Genro (PSOL), Preacher Everaldo (PSC) and Levy Fidelix (PRTB) attended. For the first time, at the time of the question of one candidate to another, we observed the face of both, that is, both the face of those who asked the question as the face of those who respond. This change was interesting because it was possible to see the reactions of presidential candidates. In general, the meeting was marked by the attacks among the candidates, and these onslaughts came from all of them, from the first question asked by Marina Silva. The debate was also marked by the fact that none of the candidates submit proposals to debated topics. The only theme that has been explored for more than one candidate was the issue of the “new politics” defended by Marina Silva: it was approached by Aécio Neves, Levy Fidelix and Luciana Genro. Aécio asked if it would be necessary a “degree of coherence” in Marina’s discourse, since she had stated that would not step in certain podiums supported by her party – including PSDB podium in the State of São Paulo – but if she won the elections, she wanted in her governance, the presence of José Serra from PSDB, whom the former Minister had denied support in 2010, on the occasion of the
second round between him and Dilma. Levy Fidelix questioned how Marina would rule with so many contradictions, because of her association with people who owed large sums of taxes, and Luciana Genro affirmed the economists working with the former Minister were people who had historic ties with PSDB, and that the “new politics” would bring nothing new and his governance would be equal to the previous ones. In all the answers, Marina failed to be convincing, repeating that she would rule along with the best ones of the parties, but insinuating that even if the people with whom she would work had certain private interests, if they had something to contribute, she would accept working with them. Words and phrases like “reckless management” (issued by Aécio Neves regarding Dilma’s management ahead of Petrobras issues) and “flippancy” (Dilma’s response on the same subject), exemplify the atmosphere that guided the first debate between the candidates of 2014 election.

The last debate before the election, held by Rede Globo [Globo Television Network], was attended by the same candidates who participated in the first televised debate by Rede Bandeirantes [Bandeirantes Television Network]. The debate’s atmosphere was tense for all candidates and there were many sensitive issues raised, especially the Petrobras scandal, attacking the President Dilma Rousseff. Unlike 2010, when the leading candidates decided not to come into confrontation, in 2014 there was a direct clash between them (for example, Dilma chose Aécio Neves three times in this debate to answer her questions). The “new politics” defended by Marina Silva was again questioned by several presidential candidates, as Aécio Neves, Dilma and Luciana Genro. The question Marina asked to the President on the role of the Central Bank, ended up attacking her political inexperience, while Dilma stroke back stating that it sounds strange this comment coming from someone who advocated a “new politics”, and she questioned if someone inexperienced could not be the President. In general, in the questions asked by Marina to Dilma, it seemed that the last one responded more consistently. The same in relation to the clash between Marina and Luciana Genro. The issue of a “new politics” was raised and was not convincingly explained by the former Minister. That said, it is important to emphasize that as the debate held by Rede Bandeirantes [Bandeirantes Television Network], the event organized by Globo TV had no clash of ideas and proposals between the presidential candidates, and between the candidates with minor voting intentions in the polls, we can see a canned spiel and limited. Among the leading candidates, i.e., those with a chance to dispute in the second round, the clash was marked by a deconstruction of the other candidates with well-targeted attacks. In this context,
Dilma and Aécio performed better when compared to Marina Silva, and the final confrontation, specifically, was essential in solidifying both the fall of the vote intentions for the former Minister registered in the polls, as the advance of the PSDB candidate.

4.2.3. Similarities and differences in the campaign and speech of the candidate Marina Silva

In 2010, she stood out in her speech on the issue of the environment, possibly because of her performance as a Minister and Senator and because of the fact that she was launched as a candidate for the Green Party – being the sustainability one of the general guidelines that guided her government program. In addition, Marina stood as the third way, an alternative to PT/PSDB polarization. Thus, the applicant considered that these two parties, which alternated in power since the 1994 elections, did not keep any kind of constructive relationship for the benefit of the country – which she called opposition for the opposition – being also restricted in their actions due alliances and pre-established commitments. This way, the former Minister placed herself as the only one capable of joining these two parties (and the others too), working along with the “best ones” of each, for a specific purpose: the benefit of the country. For her, this situation would be fairly easy, since not having prior agreements, and neither belonging to the opposition, nor to the situation, she could more easily walk through into the political field. However, more specific issues related to the form of government given the lack of alliances of his candidacy, i.e., names that would make a possible government or how could be the articulation of her governance with the “best ones”, were not addressed accurately in her campaign.

Regarding the themes presented, Marina recognized the achievements of the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and asserted that she would continue and broaden social policies – what she called the “third generation of social programs”. In general, the candidate advocated greater investment in education and health and greater austerity in public expenditure – that austerity would take place through the supervision and transparency that would contain misappropriation of public funds. For the candidate, a President of the Republic should have strategic thinking. She herself posed as someone with a strategic vision, closer to former presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula. Marina has proposed the creation of “green taxes” that would be paid in the event of carrying out activities that would bring harm to the
environment. In relation to agribusiness, the proposal was a sustainable path based on three pillars: productivity, conservation and income generation. The use of oil, in turn, was defended by the candidate, but considering investments in innovation and technology so that its use would not be needed in the future. The former Minister calculated a greater involvement of civil society, in addition to political, tax and social security reform. In general, 2010 elections took place in a normal context, with big questions to be answered by the candidates, but without influence of great events.

In turn, 2014 elections took place in a much tenser context. In this sense, the demonstrations that gained national proportion on June 2013, demonstrated the dissatisfaction of the population with several themes and set the stage for a discourse to respond to the longing of Brazilian society. Marina, who had already showed up in 2010 and positioned herself as an alternative to PT/PSDB polarization, stands in 2013 (during the creation of the Sustainability Network) as a leadership supposedly able to make the changes necessary to the country. After the death of Eduardo Campos and her formalization as a candidate for President for PSB, the discourse of a “new politics”, together with a political reform proposal, greater popular participation in decision-making and oversight processes, greater transparency in public expenditure, were elements that progressed pari passu with the longings of the population. Thus, considering the context leading up to the 2014 elections, it can be said that the speech and the positioning of Marina helped explain the positive performance of her application at the beginning of the Presidential race in 2014.

Marina Silva’s 2014 campaign showed some similarities to the 2010 campaign, especially with regard to proposal of continuity and expansion of social programs, the recognition of the achievements of previous governments, combating misappropriation of public monies, among others. The issue of how she would govern if elected was raised again. She said she would rule with the best, but again she did not make clear how that would be done – taking into account a highly fragmented National Congress, as the Brazilian people. Marina again advocated higher investment in education and health, but her explanations of how she could get enough amounts for these and other investments were not convincing. Once again the candidate proposed a political reform, assuming greater social participation.

However, some differences are noticeable. Even defending the environment, her positioning and speech in relation to this issue was significantly different from 2010. The environmental issue has not been addressed with the same intensity as the previous year,
even seeming that it has been put in second plan. It can be noted that, unlike the previous election, in 2014 both the government program and the positioning of Marina in relation to some issues have been subject to fierce criticism, requiring a firm position and concrete answers from the candidate. That’s because in 2014 Marina represented a real threat to the other candidates, something that did not occur in 2010 – a fact that can be observed in the results of polls that placed her second in the contest. Thus, both her positioning as her speech were much more charged. Subjects that until then had been raised but not explored come to occupy a prominent position in the discourse of the other candidates, widely addressed by the press and in the debates. Marina was charged about LGBT issues, when presented progressive measures and got back the day after (the former Minister, due to the government policy changing on this issue, said at the time that the document was “in motion”, which hinted that other changes could happen). Even though historically contrary to the GMOs, position defended when she was an environment Minister, Marina said it was a “myth”. Another hot topic of this campaign was her positioning towards the Central Bank, because sometimes she talked about “autonomy” and other times she talked about “independence” of the body (remembering that the candidate, in her formation, was contrary to the capitalist model of production). The former Minister also said the decrease in the share of public banks and the need to qualify the investments offered by them were necessary, which according to some would be extremely difficult. The criticism that Marina would make the processes more expensive was not refuted by the applicant, on the contrary, was indirectly corroborated by her speech.

In general, the topics presented in her two campaigns have certain similarity, but with emphasis on different topics. In 2010, the major topic of Marina’s campaign was the issue of sustainability, and her government would take place through the strategic vision that the applicant claimed to have. But in 2014, the main topic that guided the discussion was the “new politics”, and her management would be possible through the government with “the best” of each party. The change in the main subject can be thought considering the new demands brought with the demonstrations of June 2013 and the appropriation of the same by the campaign of the candidate or because it is an item on the PSB’s agenda and not on Marina Silva’s. In this last election, it is clear that she presented a speech focused on specific sectors – financial market, agribusiness, Evangelical Protestants – being developed in the course of the presidential race by pressure applied from these sectors and from her opponents in the race, and this way, demonstrating some inconsistency in her positions. Finally, we also can see that in the speeches of the
applicant, in both campaigns, was not used an easy-to-understand language for the population, i.e., there were not used clear references so that the communication with society were effective.

4.2.4. A study of Marina’ performance in 2014 IBOPE Surveys

In 2014, Marina Silva started the race with 29% of the vote intentions in the first poll carried out after her candidacy formalization, reaching 33% in the survey carried out on September 2nd. Thereafter, the voting intentions for the candidate decreased singularly. It can be noted that the performance of the candidate Aécio Neves was parallel the opposite of Marina’s performance: having fluctuated negatively after the former Minister entry in the election, he maintained the stability that led to growth of 5 percentage points observed in the last survey before the first round of elections, moment when he overcame Marina. On the other hand, Dilma Rousseff, candidate for re-election, presented a linear performance, oscillating within the margin of error throughout the election. Marina ended the contest in 2014 with 21% of mentions (in 2010, the presidential candidate ended the presidential race with 16% of voting intentions in the survey prior to elections).

Table 10. Voting Intentions for President – From August to October/2014 (%)

![Graph showing voting intentions](chart.png)

Source: IBOPE Intelligence
The chart above does not include the two surveys that were carried out by IBOPE Intelligence in the period prior to the death of Eduardo Campos27. However, it should be noted that the entry of Marina Silva in the race meant that the percentage of undecided retreated on average 6 percentage points. Among those who declared their intention to cast a blank vote or spoil their vote, the decline was an average of 7 percentage points. Dilma Rousseff and Aécio Neves also fluctuated negatively (average of 4 percentage points each), as well as Preacher Everaldo (PSC), which until then was the evangelical candidate in the race with a supposed greater possibility of growth.

IBOPE Intelligence also raised the potential vote and rejection of the main presidential candidates. In this context, the interviewees respond if they certainly would vote for or maybe could vote (potential of voting), or would not vote at all in the candidates (rejection). The respondent can still answer that he/she does not know the applicant and therefore prefers not to give opinions. In this context, the potential voting for Marina Silva declined over the election and the rejection increased. In the August 25th survey, 65% of voters said they certainly shall vote or would vote for her. This amount remains the same in the survey carried out on September 15th28. However, in the following researches, Marina fluctuates negatively, culminating in her worst performance in this indicator: in the survey on October 1st29, Marina has the potential voting of 56% – a decrease of 9 percentage points from September to October. At the same time, the rejection of candidate increased substantially, from 24% in late August to 31% in early October. It should be noted that the first research, after her official recognition, 10% of the less educated voters and 12% of voters with family income up to 1 minimum wage said they did not know her enough. These percentages reached 6% and 4%, respectively in these segments in the survey carried out on October 1st. Thus, it can be said that Marina was known for a significant portion of the entire population.

27 Available on http://www.eleicoes.ibopeinteligencia.com/Documents/Nacional%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rios/JOB_0462-1_BRASIL%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rio%20de%20tabelas.pdf and http://www.eleicoes.ibopeinteligencia.com/Documents/Nacional%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rios/JOB_0462-2_BRASIL%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rio%20de%20tabelas.pdf, accessed on 04/05/2015, at 05:21PM.
28 Available on http://www.eleicoes.ibopeinteligencia.com/Documents/Nacional%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rios/JOB_0462-5_BRASIL%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rio%20de%20tabelas.pdf, accessed on 03/16/2015, at 02:12 PM.
29 Available on http://www.eleicoes.ibopeinteligencia.com/Documents/Nacional%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rios/JOB_0462-8_BRASIL%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rio%20de%20tabelas.pdf, accessed on 03/16/2015, at 02:12 PM.
However, Aécio Neves' potential of voting remained on the same level throughout the election, with small oscillations during the presidential campaign. The same can be said about the rejection of this candidate. What changed significantly was the knowledge of the population in relation to him: in late August 15% of respondents said they did not know him enough (among the poorest this number was 23%, and 20% among the inhabitants of southern Brazil), while in early October, only 6% of respondents made such a statement (7% among the poorest and 11% among residents of the South region).

The candidate for reelection, Dilma Rousseff, also did not show significant fluctuations of potential voting. But, unlike Aécio Neves, it was the candidate’s rejection that has fluctuated the most, and positively: from 43% on late August to 37% in the survey carried out on October 1st.

Table 12. Voting Intentions and Rejection for Aécio Neves – From August to October/2014 (%)
Table 13. Voting Intentions and Rejection for Dilma Rousseff – From August to October/2014 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Would vote</th>
<th>Would not vote at all</th>
<th>I don't know her enough to have an opinion</th>
<th>Don't know/Did not respond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08/25/2014</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/15/2014</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/22/2014</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/29/2014</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/01/2014</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBOPE Intelligence

4.2.5. Difficulties faced by Marina Silva in 2014

Observing the recent Brazilian political scene regarding the presidential elections since 1989 provides an analysis of the population’s voting pattern at the federal level. As mentioned above, the Brazilian people is more likely to continue than to change, and this fact is verified in both of Fernando Collor de Melo elections in 1989 (and the fear of the poorest people to vote for a “left-wing” candidate), as the elections of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994 and 1998, and of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in 2002 and 2006. In the case of Lula, even contemplating himself the figure of “change”, by writing the “Letter to the Brazilian people” in 2002, has committed to the financial market and in keeping the economic stability achieved on the two previous FHC mandates. Lula reassured those who were afraid of radical changes. Considering this situation in the Brazilian context, the study of some important aspects of the presidential race in 2010 and 2014 enables that some observations can be made.

First, it should be noted carefully the political context presented in 2014: there was the expectation of a significant portion of the population for “change”, explained in the demonstrations of June 2013 and also in the polls, but what actually happened, mainly in the State elections, was the opposite: in 23 of the 27 States, or the governor was re-elected or if re-election was not possible, his successor has made it. The same was found at the federal level, since Dilma Rousseff was re-elected. Thus, the context in which it appears the candidacy of Marina Silva in 2014, after the death of Eduardo Campos, cannot possibly be regarded as highly favorable to her, since it is likely that this high favorability
was only apparent, that is, it is possible that the situation were to continue. However, considering that only 3.4 million votes separated Dilma Rousseff from the second place, Aécio Neves, in the second round of 2014 elections, there was room for an application to respond to the yearnings of the people who were longing for a change: the question is that possibly Marina Silva failed to be the representative of that electorate, for failing to translate (and convince) for what would be the new way of doing politics – the new way of governing – and more serious positioning problems. Therefore, Aécio Neves appears with an option for these voters, not as a change towards innovation, but in the sense of alternation of power. That is to say, Aécio, representing a part of the population wishes, would represent neither the novelty nor a new way of doing politics, but the alternation in the historic polarity between PSDB and PT. Another point to consider, which is related to this historical polarity and had influenced the performance achieved by Marina and Aécio, is that the PSDB candidate tried several times to associate the former Minister to PT, stressing the fact that she has already been affiliated to the party. With that, he introduced himself as the true opposition, i.e., he assumed the anti-PT representative position.

Second, Marina Silva’s electorate profile, both in the 2010 elections as the 2014’s, remained quite similar, i.e., Marina had the preference of the richest and most educated voters in both elections (remember that both in 2010 and in 2014, Marina and the PSDB candidates were more highlighted among these voters. However, in the last elections, it appears that these were positioned more favorably to Aécio Neves). It can be said that between a dispute and the other, Marina was able to make more homogeneous the profile of her electorate, but she under-exploited elements that could have approached her from some segments of the population: she could have explored more her life story, which certainly would bring identification with the humblest population, and for being black, she could have fueled a major debate during the presidential campaign. The voting intention of blacks, throughout the election period of 2014, observed in surveys carried out by IBOPE intelligence, was predominantly for the PT candidate, Dilma Rousseff – probably because of the policies of quotas and other social inclusion measures carried out in her first term and during Lula government. In the survey held exclusively for this job, blacks prefer Aécio Neves. In other words, both at a time as in the other, the black population that declares itself as so does not recognize in Marina’s figure.

Third, it is important to stress out that 2014 elections were very peculiar. When Marina began to fluctuate negatively in the polls, the clash took place between her and
Aécio Neves, since it seemed inevitable Dilma Rousseff in the second round. The analysis of the presidential candidates’ campaigns suggests that in 2010, Marina Silva appeared (or was presented) as a candidate of great virtu (concept used in Machiavelli’s classic view) and there were no other candidates so virtuous, since Dilma Rousseff was only Lula’s candidate, unknown elsewhere, and the image of José Serra was diminished with a high rejection rate in the polls and a campaign seen as “unfocused and without an identity” 30. However, in 2014, having emerged empowered from the dispute in 2010, Marina faces the consistent application of Dilma Rousseff and the candidate Aécio Neves, who, having started the presidential race discreetly, fluctuated negatively after his entry in the race and has got to stabilize subsequently, with consistent performance, together with an effective personal performance. Thus, during the election period, Aécio also positioned himself as a virtuous candidate and it was between him and Marina Silva that was the clash of possible second round with Dilma Rousseff (in fact, even earlier, Aécio already had given samples of his political influence because he was able to articulate a prominent position within PSDB, and having assumed the Presidency of the party, he became the natural candidate for President of the Republic. This way, she eventually weakened his party opponent, José Serra, who wanted both Presidency of PSDB and competing for the majority seat in 2014 elections). That said, it appears that in 2010, Marina did not represent a real threat to the other candidates, since the confrontation took place between PT and PSDB, preventing her to be fiercely confronted during the campaign (in fact, the fierce opposition happened to PT candidate, Dilma Rousseff. However, towards the end of the race, the two leading candidates – Dilma and Serra – decided not to come into confrontation, fearing they could lose votes. It was Marina who became the “executioner” of her opponents and who raised the most sensitive issues). The opposite occurred in 2014, as representing a real threat, the clash was much harder than in the previous election. Soon after the formalization of Marina’s candidacy, her two main opponents, Dilma and Aécio, endeavored to deconstruct the image of the former Minister, questioning her administrative capacity, or exploring the contradictions in her speech. Beyond this aspect, there are other unfavorable ones that must be taken into account, so that Marina performance can be understood, for example, the time required for the television propaganda free campaign. Marina had around 2 minutes to present her proposals, while Rousseff had something around 11 minutes, and Aécio Neves, 4 minutes.

30 According to the edition of the newspaper O Estado de SP, from September 29th 2010, page A4.
The costs spent on campaigns should also be considered: PSB’s Marina Silva said the spending limit of her campaign would be 150 million reais, while Dilma Rousseff declared 298 million reais, and Aécio Neves, 290 million reais. Another aspect, not least important, is the fact that while Aécio and Dilma began their campaigns in early July 2014, Marina began her campaign, in fact, on the day August 20th, when she was made official as a candidate for President from PSB. Of course, before that date, she was campaigning, but as the vice of Eduardo Campos, i.e., in a totally different situation. The result of her late entry into the campaign as a candidate for President can be seen, for example, in the travels of the presidential candidates in Brazil: according to Estadão, in its September 28th issue, Dilma traveled to 11 States, totaling 35 cities, a relatively small amount compared to the other candidates, but understood because Dilma is the President of Brazil and she is already known by the population. However, Aécio Neves visited 21 States, 56 cities in the three-month campaign. And Marina, from late August to October, traveled to 15 States, covering 28 cities – i.e., Aécio visited twice the number of cities than Marina (including Rio Branco, the former Minister’s redoubt – the place she even did not visit). She prioritized the trips to places in eastern Brazil that include major cities and major capitals, ignoring the States in the west (with the exception of the Amazon), while Aécio made a more widespread campaign.

Finally, it should be considered that Marina’s high performance in the polls after her entry in the race as a candidate for President was also motivated by the moment of big commotion caused by Eduardo Campos death. A clear example of this is the case of PSB’s candidate Paulo Câmara in the State of Pernambuco, once he had 11% of the vote intentions and went to 29% on August 25th – right after the tragedy involving Campos. His performance was upward throughout the whole campaign, culminating in his election in the first round.

5. Results of 2014 Presidential Elections

The first round of 2014 elections took place on October 5th, and there were great expectations to people’s participation, since due to the demonstrations with the crowd overflowing the streets across the country in the previous year, it was considered the possibility of high abstention. However, unlike what some predicted, the vast majority of voters went to the ballot box. The polls indicated a sharp decline of voting intentions for the candidate Marina Silva in parallel to the growth of Aécio Neves, but only the final
result of the elections would show the intensity of this movement. President Dilma Rousseff obtained 41.59% of the votes, followed by Aécio with 33.55%, and Marina with 21.32%.

In general, according to the following map, Dilma outperformed the other candidates in the States of North and Northeast, Aécio won in the country’s Central-West, Southeast and South regions and Marina won in 2 States, Acre and Pernambuco.

Map 1. 2014 Presidential Election Results – by State (1st Round)

However, it is important to point out the performance of the candidates. The largest electoral colleges – considering the States with more than 6 million voters – according to TSE31, are: São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná. Together, these six States total up 60.1% of the Brazilian electorate. Dilma Rousseff won in four of them (Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Rio Grande do

Sul), with a significant voting in her favor in the State of Bahia and with a fiercer voting with Aécio Neves in Rio Grande do Sul. Therefore, it appears that the President had a better performance in the greater electoral colleges. Aécio Neves won in São Paulo (the greatest country’s electoral college) and Paraná.

On the other hand Marina, won most votes in Pernambuco (possibly because of her association with Eduardo Campos), but had a percentage very close to Dilma Rousseff’s, i.e., the PT candidate also performed well in that State.

**Table 1. 2014 Presidential Election Results – by Greater Electoral Colleges (1st round)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aécio</th>
<th>Dilma</th>
<th>Marina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>44.22%</td>
<td>25.82%</td>
<td>25.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais</td>
<td>39.75%</td>
<td><strong>43.48%</strong></td>
<td>14.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>26.93%</td>
<td><strong>35.62%</strong></td>
<td>31.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia</td>
<td>18.27%</td>
<td><strong>61.44%</strong></td>
<td>18.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Sul</td>
<td>41.42%</td>
<td><strong>43.21%</strong></td>
<td>11.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraná</td>
<td><strong>49.79%</strong></td>
<td>32.54%</td>
<td>14.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brazilian Superior Electoral Court

In the second round of the presidential election, the clash was between Dilma Rousseff and Aécio Neves. Unlike 2010, when Marina decided not to declare support for any of the presidential candidates, in 2014 she decided to support the PSDB candidate (which made Roberto Amaral, president of PSB, leave the party leadership). Dilma was re-elected with 51.64% of the votes, and Aécio received 48.36% (a relatively small difference between the two candidates in contention – 3,459,000 votes – made the legitimacy of Dilma’s election was questioned, even with the vote recount requested by PSDB). Considering the results in the Brazilian States, the performance of both candidates were very similar to the first round, but with some changes: Dilma won in the first round in Rio Grande do Sul, but in the second round it was Aécio who fared best among the gauchos [Rio Grande do Sul-born voters] (in the first round, Dilma won Aécio in that State by a margin of about 114,000 votes. In the second round, the PSDB candidate won with a difference of 455,000 votes). Marina’s support to Aécio was not enough to make him win in both States where she had won in the first round. The PSDB candidate won in Acre and Dilma won in Pernambuco.
Table 2. 2014 Presidential Election Results – by Greater Electoral Colleges (2\textsuperscript{nd} round)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aécio</th>
<th>Dilma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>64.31%</td>
<td>35.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais</td>
<td>47.59%</td>
<td>52.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>45.06%</td>
<td>54.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia</td>
<td>29.84%</td>
<td>70.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Sul</td>
<td>53.53%</td>
<td>46.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraná</td>
<td>60.98%</td>
<td>39.02%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brazilian Superior Electoral Court

6. Research from IBOPE Intelligence Institute – March 2015

The year of 2015 began with some problems to be faced by President Dilma Rousseff, such as the crisis in Brazil’s reservoirs of hydroelectric plants and the resulting adjustment in electric power tariffs, increasing of taxes and petrol price, in addition to proposed tax adjustments (already announced in 2014) to be held mainly in labor which brought great dissatisfaction for the population (by changing the rules for receipt of sickness insurance, unemployment insurance, etc.). The ongoing corruption investigations on Petrobras and the creation of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, rendered common for some the talk of impeachment, asking for the revocation of the President’s mandate (also it is noted the dissatisfaction of a part of the population with the Workers Party – which once positioned itself vehemently against corruption – involved in allegations of corruption scandals since Lula’ government). In this context, Dilma also faces alignment difficulties within her own party and along with the coalition. The consequence of all these issues is evidenced by the PT’s government. In the survey carried out by IBOPE Intelligence at the request of the National Industry Confederation between March 21\textsuperscript{st} to 25\textsuperscript{th} 2015, the President presented the worst rating since the beginning of her first term: 64% of respondents considered Dilma’s governance bad or very bad, 23% considered it regular, and for 12% her government was excellent or good.
Between de 12th and 16th days of March 2015, the IBOPE Intelligence Institute carried out an exclusive voting intention research for this work, being tested the same names that competed in the presidential race of 2014, considering voting intention questions as if the election occurred that moment. The survey reveals that the PSDB candidate, Aécio Neves, would be the first place in the race with wide advantage. In this period of days, 2002 people were interviewed throughout the country and in the scenario with all the names that competed in 2014, Aécio Neves (PSDB) ranks first with 34% of the votes, followed by Dilma Rousseff (PT) with 21%, and Marina Silva (PSB) with 14%. The other candidates reach together 3% of mentions. Blank and void totaled 18% (11 percentage points higher than recorded in the survey of October 4, 2014), and 9% do not know and did not know how to answer, 9%. Marina still stands out among the younger and more educated voters, but it is noted at this point a significant difference in a segment in which she stood out previously, the richest one: when we look at the percentages by income, regardless of family income of the respondent, the percentages vary between 13% and 14%, that is, no significant variations in this segment are observed. In the South region, only 7% of voters declare vote for the former State Minister, while in other regions this number varies between 14% and 16%. Once again it is among the Protestants that Marina stands out (18%), while among the Catholics, she presents a percentage slightly under the total mentions (13%).

Table 14. Federal Government Ratings – From October/2014 to March/2015 (%)
An important point must be emphasized: Aécio gain votes among the lesser educated voters and Dilma loses significantly, since 27% of voters with education up to 4th grade of elementary school declare vote for Aécio (18% in the survey carried out on 04 October), and 30% stated they vote for Dilma Rousseff (55% in early October). The data from this research indicate that at the time of the survey, there was no polarization by income between these candidates, as noted before, and also suggest that the North and Northeast regions can no longer be considered as PT’s redoubts. In previous research to the first round of the elections, Dilma won 41% of the votes in the North/Central-West regions as Aécio got 22%. In the Northeast region, the President got 55%, and the PSDB candidate, 13%. However, in this study, 41% of voters of the North/Central-West regions declare their intention to vote for Aécio, and only 16% of the population of these regions declare voting for Dilma. When we look at the percentage of the Northeast region, both Aécio and Dilma have 30% of mentions each.

Simulating a second round, with the same candidates who competed in 2014, Aécio Neves performed a percentage much bigger than Dilma Rousseff: the PSDB candidate received 49% of mentions, while PT’s got 23%. In this context, blank and void add up 21%, and those who don’t know or prefer not to answer, 7%.

In this survey we also raised the potential voting for leading candidates and the rejection of each of them. The potential voting for Marina Silva in this survey is lower than that recorded in the previous survey to the elections, despite the downward trend observed during the presidential race, as there was an increasing of rejection to her. The potential voting for the former Minister stood at 41%, and among these voters, 10% said they definitely would vote for her, and 31% stated they could vote for her. In turn, the rejection of the candidate went from 31% in October 2014 to 48% in this survey.

Dilma Rousseff has a potential of voting even lower and therefore an increase in her rejection: 26%, being 16% of those who surely would vote for her and 10% of those who could vote (percentage far under that observed in the survey carried out in early October 2014, 34% and 22%, respectively). However, the rejection of the President, which ranged between 37% and 43% in 2014, now stands at 68%.

The potential of voting for Aécio Neves is of 57%, the sum of those who said they definitely would vote (34%) and those who would vote for him (23%). Noting that in the survey of October 4th, the candidate’s voting potential was 55%. Thus, it is noticed that there were no significant changes in the period when the data are analyzed together (from 55% to 57%), but the significant difference was found between those who said they
definitely would vote for him (from 17% to 34%). The rejection to the PSDB candidate ranged from 32% in October to 35% this time.

We can identify the behavior of voters who said they definitely would vote for any of the candidates in relation to the other candidates. From this perspective, 63% of voters who said they definitely would vote for Marina Silva, said they could also vote for Aécio. Among the voters decisive in their votes for the PSDB candidate, it can be noted that 40% of them said they could also vote for the former Minister. Thus, one can see that Aécio can capture more votes from Marina, than the reverse. Marina also captures voting for Dilma, since 31% of the President voters said they would vote for the PSB candidate. A different situation, however, occurs in relation to Dilma Rousseff: 90% of the voters for Marina and 95% of Aécio’s electorate would not vote for Dilma in any way. These numbers indicate that, at this time, the President has reached a limit of voting intentions, failing to capture the votes of the other two main candidates tested.

The survey also raised the vote cast in the first round of the 2014 elections. In this context, 42% of respondents stated they voted for Dilma Rousseff, 28% that voted for Aécio Neves, and 10% for Marina Silva. Crossing the current voting intentions for the candidates with declared information of voting in the first round, we can see that Aécio is who got a major number of votes: 17% of those who state that voted for Marina Silva in 2014, now opt for the PSDB candidate (two thirds would keep voting for her), and 16% who voted for Dilma in the first round of elections, now choose Aécio (only 45% sill would vote for the President).
### Table 3. Current Voting Intentions x Declared Vote in Elections 1st Round (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>AÉCIO NEVES</th>
<th>DILMA</th>
<th>MARINA SILVA</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>DID NOT VOTE/BLANK/VOID/DK/DNR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aécio Neves</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilma</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marina Silva</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preacher Everaldo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luciana Genro</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank/Void</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/Did not respond</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBOPE Intelligence

#### 6.1. Matching Analyses

In this same survey, a card of the respondents containing some positive and negative features was presented. Respondents were directed to associate up to three of these attributes to each of the major presidential candidates. Thus, a matching analysis was performed, considering the amount of times each characteristic was attributed to each candidate. Thus, it appears that at that time, Aécio Neves is the one that receives the most positive mentions, and is mostly seen as “achiever”, “capable” as a politician who has a “forward-thinking” and that “has good ideas”. Marina Silva is recognized by the population as “honest”, but she is also seen as “weak”, “unprepared” and “undecided”. Dilma Rousseff, in turn, is the one that is more associated with negative attributes, such as “not capable”, someone who is “not trustable”, a “source of shame” and who “do not keep her promises”.

The same question was asked in the IBOPE survey carried out on September 29th, 2014\(^{32}\) and the matching analysis shows some variations. At that moment, Aécio was seen as someone who has a “forwarded-thinking” and also “has good ideas”. Marina, however, was also associated as “weak” and “unprepared”, but she was also seen as “hard worker”

\(^{32}\) Available on [http://www.eleicoes.ibopeinteligencia.com/Documents/Nacional%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rios/JOB_0462-7_BRASIL%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rio%20de%20tabelas.pdf](http://www.eleicoes.ibopeinteligencia.com/Documents/Nacional%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rios/JOB_0462-7_BRASIL%20-%20Relat%C3%B3rio%20de%20tabelas.pdf), accessed on 04/07/2015, at 05:2PM.
and as someone who “hears from the people”. Dilma, in turn, presented positive attributes as “keeps her promises”, “prepared”, and negative, as “corrupt” and “unprepared”. In the two graphs in the Annex at the end of this study, it can be seen more clearly the characteristics most associated to each of the candidates in the two moments.

6.2. Statistical Analyses Key Drivers

Through the same question of characteristics association to the main candidates, it was possible to perform the statistical analysis Key Drivers, which consists in associating the voting intention of respondents to the attributes selected by them to describe each one of the presidential candidates. In this context, it appears that the voter, when declaring the intention to vote for one of the names, usually attributes to that candidate only positive characteristics, while only assign negative characteristics to others.

Marina Silva's voters consider her as a qualified person, someone who hears from the people, a hard-worker, a source of pride, intelligent, achiever, honest, precise, someone who keeps her promises and has good ideas and is a forward-thinking one, but believes that Dilma Rousseff is false, not trustable, a source of shame and distant from the people. For these, Aécio Neves is not trustable.

Dilma Rousseff's voters consider her as a qualified person, someone who hears from the people, a hard-worker, a source of pride, intelligent, achiever, honest, precise, someone who keeps her promises and has good ideas and is a forward-thinking. For these, Aécio Neves is arrogant and Marina Silva is corrupt and seen as someone who is not trustable.

Aécio Neves' voters consider him as a qualified one, someone who hears from the people, keeps his promises, is a hard-worker, a source of pride, intelligent, achiever, honest, precise, someone who has good ideas and is a forward-thinking one. For these, Dilma Rousseff is unprepared, weak, unqualified, arrogant, corrupt, not trustable and does not keep her promise. In turn, Marina is seen as someone not trustable.
7. Conclusion

Having entered strengthened in the 2014 dispute, Marina Silva faced a number of difficulties during the presidential election alongside errors in her positioning and a campaign strategy. These aspects have worn out the image of the candidate, giving her a overthrowing her the greater political role that she once had. In late August 2014, Marina launched her government plan and stepped back a day later, suppressing some program segments which contained measures favorable to LGBT policies. The fact turned out to generate the impression of a candidate’s lack of consistency, which was explored by her opponents and relative allies, as well as the press. Similarly, the issue of a “new politics” presented by Marina was widely questioned by the opponents. In fact, she was not able to put into words what would be the “new politics” (she affirmed that would work with “the best ones”, but without mentioning how it would be done), and this was realized by the population (despite that Marina’s speech on a “new politics” that was to govern with everyone, regardless of being in the situation or the opposing party, within the parties that supported her candidacy for the Presidency strictly speaking it did not occur, since she was criticized by some members of PV and PSB). These situations demonstrate a possible lack of preparation of the former Minister besides her weak campaign. This vulnerability can be seen in one aspect in particular: the issue raised by the opponents about the difficulty she would have in governing, and an alleged failure of the applicant to articulate support in Nation Congress. This same question was raised against the former Senator during the presidential campaign in 2010, as it had been said that her then party, PV, had failed to form alliances and that would impact on the governance of a possible mandate. To this, it appears that, four years later, the same question was asked and explored without concrete answers by Marina. In short, the inconsistencies of her positioning and the contradictions in her speech eventually suited as inputs for her opponents. And in addition to the already reported problems, since Marina’s strong growth in voting intention polls may have been partly driven by the commotion of the population with the tragic death of her running mate, it is possible that the reverse movement is guided by the increasingly pragmatic behavior of the Brazilian electorate. Possibly the voters were taken to analyze the context of the elections and the candidates, and decide more pragmatically. Marina failed to respond strongly enough to the attacks and turning them to an advantage, and thus the weaknesses presented in the campaign were decisive for the final result of the
elections. The applicant finished the race in third place again with a performance very similar to that achieved in 2010, but unlike the other elections, weakened.

8. Bibliographic References


ANNEX II – Matching Analyses (September 2014)